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The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting
Dorothy S. Lund*
American investors have begun to embrace the reality that academics have been
championingfor decades-that a broad-based, passive indexing strategy is superior to
picking individual stocks or investing in actively managedfunds. But there are several
reasons to believe that the rise of passive investing will have harmful consequences for
firm governance, shareholders, and the economy. First, because passivefunds seek only to
match the performance of an index-not outperform it-they lack afinancial incentive to
ensure that each of the companies in their very large portfolios are well-run. Second,
passivefinds face an acute collective action problem: any investment in improving the
performance ofa company will benefit allfunds that track the index equally, while only the
activist fund incurs the costs. Third, governance interventions are especially costly for
passivefunds, which do not generatefirm-specific information as a byproduct of investing
and thus must expend additionalresources to identify underperformingfirms and evaluate
interventionsproposed by other investors. Such expenditures would undo the cost savings
that attractedinvestors to the passivefund in thefirst place.
For these reasons, many passive funds are likely to leave company performance to
the invisible hand of the marketplace. Even if a fund does choose to intervene, it will
rationallyadhere to a low-cost, one-size-fits-all approach to governance that is unlikely to
be in the company's best interest. The scope of this problem is potentially immense: as
investors continue to flock towardpassive investment vehicles, the institutionalinvestors
that dominate the passive fund market will increasingly influence and even control the
outcome ofshareholderinterventions-from shareholdervotes to those proposedby hedge
fund activists-creatingwidespreadeconomic harm. Forthat reason, this Article proposes
that lawmakers consider restrictingpassive funds from voting at shareholder meetings.
Doing so would reduce the influence ofpassive funds in governance and also preserve the
role of informed investors as a forcefor managerialdiscipline.

*Harry A. Bigelow Teaching Fellow and Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago. The author is grateful for
comments from Will Baude, Douglas Baird, Omri Ben-Shahar, William Birdthistle, Tony Casey, Adam Chilton,
Stephen Choi, Scott Davis, Gillian Hadfield, Todd Henderson, Aziz Huq, Ronald Gilson, Daniel Hemel,
Genevieve Lakier, Alex Lee, Saul Levmore, John Morley, Eric Posner, Ed Rock, Mark Roe, Leo Strine, Jr.,
Guhan Subramanian, and the University of Chicago Bigelow Fellows, as well as enlightening conversations with
executives, hedge fund analysts, and mutual fund advisors who wish to remain anonymous. Email:
dorothyshapiro@uchicago.edu.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, millions of investors have abandoned actively managed mutual
funds (active funds) in favor of passively managed funds (passive funds). This past year
alone, investors withdrew $340 billion from active funds (approximately four percent of
the total) while investing $533 billion into passive funds (growing the total by nine
percent).' This historically unprecedented shift in investor behavior has generated a flurry
2
of news coverage, with articles proclaiming that index funds "are eating the world."
The rise of passive investing is good news for investors, who benefit from greater
diversification and lower costs. But the implications for corporate governance are less
positive. Unlike active funds, which pick stocks based on their performance, passive
funds-a term that includes index funds and exchange traded funds (ETFs)-are designed
to automatically track a market index. For this reason, this Article contends that the growth
3
of passive funds has the potential to distort and dampen the market for corporate influence.
Participants in the market for corporate influence-generally institutional investors
and activist hedge funds 4 -use the influence that accompanies their large ownership
1.

See Morningstar Direct Asset Flows Commentary: United States, MORNINGSTAR (Jan. 11, 2017),

https://corporate.morningstar.com/us/documents/assetflows/assetflowsjan2017.pdf

(analyzing asset flows in

America) [hereinafter MorningstarDirectAssets].

2. See, e.g., Sarah Krouse et al., Meet the New CorporatePower Brokers: Passive Investors, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 24, 2016, 10:41 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-corporate-power-brokers-passive-investors1477320101; Tom McGinty et al., Index Funds are Taking Over the S&P 500, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 17, 2016),
http://www.wsj.com/graphics/index-funds-taking-over-sp-500; Jason Zweig, Are Index Funds Eatingthe World?,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 26, 2016, 11:46 AM), https://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2016/08/26/are-index-funds-eatingthe-world/; John Authers & Chris Newlands, Exchange Traded Funds: Taking Over the Markets, FIN. TIMES
(Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/a54e75d4-b7f9-lle6-ba85-95dl533d9a62; Nicole Bullock & Dan
5, 2016),
Rapid Rise of ETFs Sparks Growing Pains, FIN. TIMES (Dec.
McCrum,
https://www.ft.com/content/cf69b382-bade-1 I e6-8b45-b8b8 dd5dO8O.
3. Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past Present and Future of Shareholder Activism by Hedge
Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 61-73 (2011) (discussing the origin of the phrase "the market for corporate influence").
4. Although hedge funds are institutional investors, this Article separates activist hedge funds into their
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positions to discipline management. Although these investors lack perfect incentives to
engage in corporate stewardship, 5 their presence provides a check against managerial slack,
primarily because they identify underperforming firms as part of their investing strategy
and are motivated to discipline wayward management.
Passive funds are different. Because they seek only to match the performance of a
market index, passive funds lack a financial incentive to ensure that each of the companies
in their portfolios are well-run. For one, passive funds tend to have very large portfolios,
and therefore, an investment in improving governance at a single firm is especially unlikely
to enhance the fund's overall performance. Second, passive funds face an acute collective
action problem because investments in governance equally benefit all funds tracking the
index, while only the activist fund bears the costs. Third, governance interventions are
especially costly for a passive fund-unlike active funds, passive funds do not generate
information about firm performance as a byproduct of trading. Therefore, thoughtful
interventions would require the passive fund to expend additional resources gathering firmspecific information as well as develop governance expertise. Such expenditures would
undo the cost savings that attracted investors to the passive fund in the first place.
Accordingly, as assets continue to flow into passive funds, agency costs will increase
because managers of passive funds will be less likely to engage thoughtfully with portfolio
companies and discipline management. Passive fund managers will also be likely to adhere
to low-cost voting strategies, such as following a proxy advisor's recommendation or
voting "yes" to any shareholder proposal that meets pre-defined qualifications. And
without a consensus about what constitutes good governance, there is reason to believe that
the proliferation of an unthinking, one-size-fits-all approach to governance will make many
companies worse off.
In addition, the rise of passive investing has the potential to distort hedge fund
activism. Hedge fund activists are increasingly moderated by large institutional investors
with the power to block campaigns that are not in the interest of their long-term
shareholders and catalyze interventions that are deemed beneficial. Passive funds,
however, are less likely to serve as a "keel" to activism, which means not only that certain
beneficial interventions will not occur, but also that certain detrimental interventions may
nonetheless garner substantial support.
For now, the majority of mutual fund assets are invested in active funds, which lessens

own category because of their ex ante investing strategy. See infra note 16.
5. Much has been written about the hedge fund activist's short-term perspective, as well as the collective
action problems facing mutual funds. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A
PragmaticReaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of CorporateLaw, 114 COLuM. L. REV. 449, 458-

59 (2014) [hereinafter Strine Jr., Can We Do Better?] (contending that empowering investors with short-term
investment horizons will compromise long-term value); Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for

Activist Shareholders,60 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1290-92 (2008) (arguing that activist investors' push for shortterm benefits may harm long-term shareholders); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of
Agency Capitalism:Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 887

(2013) (discussing the collective action problem facing institutional investors); Edward B. Rock, Institutional
Investors in Corporate Governance, U. PA. L. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY 1, 13 (2015) (explaining that
institutional investors suffer from a misalignment of incentives that causes them to be relatively passive when it
comes to corporate governance).
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concerns about governance distortions.6 But the rapid growth of passive investing is
predicted to continue, and already some S&P 500 companies have passive fund ownership
in excess of 20%. Moreover, the institutional investors that dominate the passive fund
market-Vanguard, BlackRock, and State Street Global Advisers-already have a
substantial voice in corporate governance. Together, the "Big Three" are the largest
shareholder of 88% of major U.S. companies. 7 In other words, the institutional investors
that favor a passive investing strategy are beginning to crowd out the active investors.
So long as institutional investors house passive funds and active funds under the same
roof, the passive funds may be able to free ride off of information generated by active funds
when there is investment overlap. But active funds invest in a smaller number of companies
than passive funds and so overlap is not guaranteed. Additionally, as assets continue to
flow out of active funds, there will be even fewer common investments, as well as less
information generated by active fund managers.
There is another reason to suspect that passive fund ownership will soon approach a
problematic level: the optimal amount of active participation in governance is likely to be
greater than the amount that is necessary to keep stock market pricing efficient. If a few
active funds police the market for underperforming stocks and use that information to
inform trading decisions, stock prices will rise and fall with company value. But a small
percentage of informed investors cannot control governance outcomes. If passive funds
own only 51% of a company's stock, they will be able to unilaterally detetmine the success
of shareholder proposals, proxy contests, and hedge fund activism, even in the face of total
opposition from informed investors. Even with less than absolute voting control, passive
9
funds could still substantially affect corporate behavior. This means that governance
distortions will appear long before stock price inefficiencies do.
The legal literature has thus far focused on a different problem associated with the
rise of passive investing, and institutional investing more broadly-the potential for
anticompetitive behavior that arises when institutional investors own large stakes in rival
The theory is that managers of highly diversified
firms in oligopolistic industries.
portfolio company management to refrain from
pressure
may
investors
institutional
11
harm their other horizontal investments.
that
would
competition
price
aggressive
This Article provides an alternative explanation: rather than inducing companies to
collude, passive fund managers are not doing enough to push management to maximize

McGinty et al., supra note 2.
See Eric A. Posner et al., A Proposalto Limit the Anti-Competitive Power of Institutional Investors, 81
ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 673 (2017).
6.
7.

8.

See generally Eugene F. Fama, Efficient CapitalMarkets: A Review of Theory andEmpirical Work, 25

J. FIN. 383 (1970).
9. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 5, at 1270-71 (discussing how minority shareholders can influence
corporate decision-making even when they have small stakes in the company).
10. See Posner et al., supra note 7; Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARv. L. REV. 1267,
1291-92 (2016); Eric Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Mutual Funds' Dark Side, SLATE (Apr. 16, 2015),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/view-from-chicago/2015/04/mutual-fundsmake.air-travel
more.expensivejinstitutional-investorsreduce.html. But see Edward B. Rock & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Defusing
the Antitrust Threat to Institutional Investor Involvement in Corporate Governance (N.Y.U. Law & Econ.
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 17-05, 2017).
11. See Posner et al., supra note 7.
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shareholder welfare. In oligopolistic industries, management may respond to the lack of
shareholder discipline with the path of least resistance: tacit collusion.12 In more
competitive industries, we can expect other problems: inflated executive compensation,
reduced productivity and growth, and inefficient acquisitions, to name a few. For that
reason, the scope of the problem is potentially much larger than the legal literature has
recognized because it extends beyond companies in oligopolistic industries, and concerns
all companies with a high concentration of passive ownership, which is a large and growing
segment of the U.S. market.
In linking passive investing and governance distortion, this Article makes four novel
contributions. First, it redeems the oft-criticized institutional investor as an important
participant in the market for corporate influence. It shows that there is a difference between
institutional investors that favor an active management strategy and those who take a
passive approach to investing and supports this observation with a description of mutual
fund activism. Second, it solves a puzzle that has perplexed some corporate law scholarswhy passive funds have failed to act as seriously engaged owners in spite of the fact that
their buy-and-hold investment strategy gives them an interest in the long-term health of
portfolio companies. In so doing, the Article develops a theory describing the acute
incentive problems that prevent passive funds from participating thoughtfully in
governance. Third, the Article shows how the rise of passive investing may exacerbate
agency cost problems at corporations, with the potential to create billions of dollars in
social welfare losses.
Finally, the Article offers a novel policy proposal for lawmakers: restrict truly passive
funds from voting at shareholder meetings. By diminishing the role of passive investors in
governance, this rule would not only reduce the risk of distortion, but also preserve the
voice of informed investors as a force for discipline. In addition, there is a compelling legal
rationale for such a restriction. Passive funds lack governance expertise and firm-specific
knowledge, and so a thoughtful voting strategy would increase costs without meaningfully
improving portfolio returns. Thoughtless voting is also likely to harm investors, as well as
other shareholders, especially as passive funds grow in size and influence. In other words,
pursuit of either approach would put the passive fund at risk of breaching its fiduciary duty
to act in its investors' best interests. A law restricting passive funds from voting, therefore,
would make both investors and fund managers better off.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II maps the rise of institutional investor
ownership and the role that it has played in controlling agency cost problems created by
the separation of ownership and control. Part III details the dramatic and historically
unprecedented rise of passive investing. It then describes the incentive problems facing
passive funds and shows how the structure of institutional investors that favor a passive
investment strategy reflect those incentives. It contends that the rise of passive investing

12.

See Jos6 Azar et al., Anti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership, J. FIN. (forthcoming 2018)

(manuscript at 4), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2427345

[hereinafter Azar et al., Anti-

Competitive Effects] ("[t]he omission to explicitly demand or incentivize tougher competition between portfolio
firms may allow managers to enjoy a 'quiet life' and thus cause an equilibrium with reduced competition and

sustained high margins"); Michelle Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate
Governance and ManagerialPreferences, 111 J. POL. ECON. 1043 (2003).

13. See, e.g., Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 12; Randall Merck et al., Do Managerial Objectives
Drive Bad Acquisitions? 45 J. FiN. 3 1 (1990).
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will increase agency costs and distort corporate governance, both by decreasing the
frequency and efficacy of governance interventions by informed investors and increasing
the likelihood that ineffective or detrimental interventions will succeed. It discusses
evidence showing that passive investing is already beginning to affect firm governance at
companies with a large concentration of passive fund ownership and contends that these
distortions will grow more severe in the future. Part IV proposes several policy reforms
that would restrict or limit the voting power of passive funds. It also explains why reforms
aimed at incentivizing actively managed funds to take an active role in governance would
be less effective than restricting passive funds from voting. Part V concludes.
II. AGENCY COSTS, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, AND THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE
INFLUENCE

Controlling agency costs has been a focus in corporate legal scholarship since at least
the 1930s, when Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means first highlighted the agency problem
created by the separation of ownership and control.14 Berle and Means posited that
collective action problems would prevent dispersed shareholders from optimally
monitoring management. Knowing this, entrenched management would do just enough to
15
satisfy shareholders and retain the residual benefits of management for themselves.
However, we no longer live in a Berle and Means world of dispersed shareholdingsthe investor base is now consolidated in the hands of large institutional investors.16 From
1980 to 1996, large institutional investors nearly doubled their share of ownership of U.S.
corporations from under 30% to over 50%.17 By 2010, institutional investors held
approximately 80% of the U.S. stock market.18 Mutual funds have been the largest drivers

14.

(1932).
15.

ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY

Id. at 82-83.

16. The term "institutional investor" encompasses institutions with very different structures and incentives.
First, there are for-profit asset managers, some of which are publically held, such as BlackRock. Rock, supra note
5, at 6. Second, there are "mutual" and nonprofit management companies, including Vanguard, whose

management company is owned by Vanguard funds and is thus indirectly owned by Vanguard investors. Id. at 7.
Third, there are public-employee pension funds, such as CalPERS, whose boards are appointed by politicians or
directly elected by voters. Unsurprisingly, these funds are generally responsive to political pressure. Fourth, there

are union-related funds, including the AFL-CIO, which typically pursue a labor agenda. Id. This Article focuses
on the first and second types of investors, which have been the primary drivers of the growth in institutional
investing.
Hedge funds are also institutional investors. Hedge funds are privately organized investment vehicles

that are not widely available to the public and thus mostly operate outside of securities regulation. The typical
hedge fund manager has strong incentives to generate positive returns because his or her pay depends primarily
on performance. See Alon Bray et al., Hedge Fund Activism, CorporateGovernance, and Firm Performance, 63
J. FIN. 1729, 1735 (2008). Hedge funds can be "activists," identifying problematic companies ex ante and then
making strategic interventions, or they can take an ex post approach to governance like mutual funds and pension
funds. Because of their ex ante investment strategy, this Article excludes activist hedge funds from the
institutional investor category.

17.
(2001).

Paul A. Gompers & Andrew Metrick, InstitutionalInvestors and Equity Prices, 116 Q. J. EcoN. 229

18.

Posner et al., supra note 7, at 7; see also Marshall E. Blume & Donald B. Keim, Institutional Investors

and Stock Market Liquidity: Trends and Relationships, Table 6 (Aug. 21, 2012) (unpublished manuscript),
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of this growth: in 1980, they owned $70 billion in assets, and in 2009, that number was up
to $7.2 trillion. 19
Initially, the increasing concentration of the shareholder base was lauded as the
solution to the agency cost problems created by the separation of ownership and control. 20
In theory, an investor with a large ownership stake in a company should have strong
incentives to monitor and discipline management because less of the benefit of monitoring
will be shared. In addition, because of their large ownership positions, institutional
investors should be less likely to use "exit" as a disciplinary tool because selling shares en
masse would depress the stock price and cause the firm to incur greater losses. For that
reason, the scholarly consensus was that large institutional investors would increasingly
use "voice" to discipline management. 2 1
But institutional investors failed to live up to these high expectations.22 In the first
place, proxy voting data seems to confirm that institutional investors take a passive
approach to governance. During the 2007 to 2009 proxy seasons, for example, mutual
funds proposed only 4.5% of all shareholder proposals, and only 0.9% addressed corporate
governance or performance issues.23 In addition, a recent study indicates that institutional
investors rarely support other shareholder proposals and are very likely to support
management proposals, voting against management only about 10% of the time.24 The fact

&

&

http://ssm.com/abstract-2147757. Although there has been a sharp increase in retail ownership of equities in the
past forty years-approximately 50% of United States households own stock, which is up 30% from 1977equity mutual funds have been the source of this growth, and not the ownership of individual stocks. Gilson
Gordon, supra note 5, at 884.
19. Changes in federal retirement policy were responsible for the growth of institutional investing. See
generally id. at 879; Rock, supranote 5, at 5. In 1974, after it came to light that a large number of pension plans
were underfunded, Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which requires
retirement plans to support any promised pension with segregated pools of assets. See I.R.C. § 41 1(a)(2)(A),
(b)(1) (2006) (setting forth minimum vesting requirements for defined benefit plans); Employee Retirement
Income and Security Act of 1974 § 203, 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (2006) (same); id. §§ 301-08 (providing for minimum
funding standards). To comply, companies diverted assets into pensions and retirement accounts that were then
invested into the capital markets. Gilson & Gordon, supranote 5, at 879-80. Modem portfolio theory also played
a role in the growth of institutional investing by increasing investor demand for highly diversified investment
vehicles. According to Markowitz's theory of the efficiency of mean-variance investing (the precursor to modem
portfolio theory), diversification improves risk-adjusted retums, and the larger the portfolio, the greater the
diversification. Moreover, because secondary markets in mature equities are highly efficient, research that adds
value is expensive and its fixed cost is best spread across large portfolios. These insights were a boon to the
mutual funds and index funds offered by institutional investors. See id.
20. See Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93
COLUM. L. REV. 795, 795-853 (1992); Bernard Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional
Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REv. 811 (1991) [hereinafter Black, Agents Watching Agents]; Ronald Gilson
Renier Kraakman, Reinventing the OutsideDirector:An Agenda for InstitutionalInvestors, 43 STAN. L. REv. 863
(1991); Bernard Black, ShareholderPassivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 575-91 (1990) [hereinafter
Black, ShareholderPassivity Reexamined].
21. See id.; John Coffee, Jr., Liquidity versus Control: the InstitutionalInvestor as CorporateMonitor, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1977) (discussing the tradeoff between liquidity and voice).
22. See Rock, supra note 5; William W. Bratton & J.A. McCahery, Introduction to INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR ACTIVISM: HEDGE FUNDS AND PRIVATE EQUITY, ECONOMICS AND REGULATION 1-38 (2015); Gilson

& Gordon, supra note 5; Strine Jr., Can We Do Better?, supra note 5, at 481.
23. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 887.
24. See Jan Fichtner et al., Hidden Power of the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-Concentration of
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that hedge fund activism has skyrocketed in the past ten years also indicates that
institutional investor stewardship has been less than perfect. If institutional investors were
optimally monitoring management, successful activist interventions that generate sustained
increases in firm value would not be so common.25
Two explanations for institutional investors' passive approach to governance have
been offered. First and most importantly, the structure of the mutual fund industry creates
a new collective action problem: a fund that invests in governance will bear the costs, but
share the benefits with competitor funds. 26 And because mutual funds compete against
each other on the basis of relative performance-i.e., how the fund performed relative to
its industry peers-those funds that invest in governance and stewardship will find
themselves less desirable than their rival funds. Second, certain interventions require the
fund to navigate a complex regulatory web, further increasing costs of governance
interventions.27
But in spite of these incentive problems and transaction costs, this Article argues that
institutional investors play a vital role in reducing agency costs, a role that has been
underappreciated. In the first place, the collective action problem facing active funds has
been overstated. Actively managed funds need not have equivalent investments in the same

CorporateOwnership, and New FinancialRisk, 19 Bus. & POL. 298, 319-20 (2017). Much has been written
about the problems with institutional investor voting, including the degree to which it merely serves to amplify
the voice of third party proxy advisors. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground?
Reflections on the Shared Interests ofManagersand Labor in a More Rational System ofCorporateGovernance,
33 J. CORP. L. 1 (2007); Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental CorporateGovernance Question We Face: Can
CorporationsBe Managedforthe Long Term Unless Their Powerfdul ElectoratesAlso Act and Think Long Term?,
66 Bus. LAW. 1 (2010) [hereinafter Strine Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question]; David F.

Larcker et al., OutsourcingShareholder Voting to Proxy Advisory Firms, 58 J. L. & ECON. 173, 173-204 (2015)
[hereinafter Larcker et al., OutsourcingShareholder Voting].
25. See C.N.V. Krishnan et al., The Second Wave ofHedge FundActivism: The ImportanceofReputation,

Clout, and Expertise, 40 J. CORP. FIN 296 (2016); Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge
Fund Activism, 115 COLuM. L. REV. 1085 (2013); Nickolay Gantchev, The Costs of Shareholder Activism:
Evidence From a Sequential Decision Model, 107 J. FIN. ECON. 610, 625 tbl.8, tbl.4A (2013) (reporting average
(median) "raw" shareholder returns of approximately 39% (33%) over the average nineteen-month campaign
period and average (median) annualized market-adjusted returns of approximately 4%); Alon Bray et al., Hedge

Fund Activism, CorporateGovernance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1750 tbl.tI (2008) (reporting
average (median) raw target shareholder returns of 42% (18%) over the campaign period and annualized average
(median) market adjusted returns of 21% (4%)); April Klein & Emanuel Zur, EntrepreneurialShareholder
Activism: Hedge Funds and Other PrivateInvestors, 64 J. FIN. 187, 188, 226 (2009) (reporting average target
shareholder market-adjusted returns of approximately 22% over a one-year post-initiation period).
26. See Lucian Bebehuk et al., The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 89

(2017) [hereinafter Bebehuk et al., Agency Problems]; Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 887; Rock, supra note
5, at 13; Jill Fisch, RelationshipInvesting: Will it Happen? Will it Work?, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1009 (1994).
27. MARK ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS (1996); Mark Roe, A Political Theory ofAmerican
Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10 (1991); Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, supra note 20;
Black, Agents Watching Agents, supra note 20. Since these articles were written, certain regulatory constraints
have been loosened. Most notably, the SEC reformed the proxy rules in 1992 to allow institutions to communicate
with other institutions without fear of liability for improper solicitation of proxies. See Regulation of

Communication Among Shareholders, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276 (Oct. 16, 1992) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249).
However, substantial regulatory hurdles remain. See generally Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Hedge Funds in
CorporateGovernance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1021 (2007) (describing regulatory barriers
to institutional investor activism).
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companies as rival funds, and so an active fund can improve its relative performance by
overweighting a stock and then investing in governance.28 Of course, some of the benefits
of intervening will be shared, the active fund still has a strong financial incentive to use
voice as a disciplinary mechanism for investments that make up a large part of its portfolio
(or rather, a larger part of its portfolio than that of its competitors).
By focusing on voting, the literature also has understated the mechanisms of
institutional investor voice, as well as the expense. Active funds generate information about
portfolio company underperformance as a byproduct of investing, and they put that
information to work in a variety of ways. In addition to voting, fund managers can utilize
three other inexpensive and effective disciplinary tools: they can (1) voice displeasure in
conversations with management; (2) threaten to sell some of their stock; or (3) tip off or
otherwise support activist hedge funds. And there is evidence that institutional investors
use these tools regularly and effectively.
As for the first tool, institutional investors have increasingly forgone activism at the
ballot box in favor of communications with management, or "engagement," which is more
effective than proxy voting, though much harder for outsiders to observe and measure.29 A
recent study documents widespread behind-the-scenes intervention by institutional
investors.30 In this study, most institutional investors indicated that they use the proxy
machinery only after informal communications fail, which would explain some of the
dismal proxy voting records. 3 1 Another study reveals that fund analysts regularly meet and
converse with management during one-on-one meetings at road shows, conferences,
investors' offices, and firm headquarters. 32
There is also evidence that informal communications with management are quite
effective. In a study conducted in 1998, researchers evaluated correspondence between the
Teachers Insurance Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF)
28. Indeed, improving the governance of overweighed companies will help the fund win the "tournament"
for investor assets, which resembles a "winner-take-all" tournament because the highest-performing fund will
reap substantially higher inflows in subsequent quarters. See Keith C. Brown et al., Of Tournaments and
Temptations: An Analysis ofManagerialIncentives in the Mutual Fund Industry, 51 J. FIN. 85 (1996).
29. See Joseph McCahery et al., Behind the Scenes: The CorporateGovernance Preferenceofinstitutional

Investors, 71 J. FIN. 2905, 2095 (Dec. 2016); Matthew J. Mallow & Jasmine Sethi, Engagement: The Missing
Middle Approach in the Bebchuk-Strine Debates, 12 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 386, 386 (2016); Susanne Craig, The
Giant
of
Shareholders
Quietly
Stirring,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
18,
2013),
By
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/19/business/blackrock-a-shareholding-giant-is-quietly-stirringhtml.
contrast, shareholder proposals have very low passage rates, see Stuart Gillan & Laura Starks, Corporate
Governance Proposalsand ShareholderActivism: The Role ofInstitutionalInvestors, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 275, 286
(2000); Stuart Gillan & Laura Starks, The Evolution ofShareholderActivism in the United States, 19 J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN. 55, 61-62 (2007), and proxy fights are very expensive, see Gantchev, supra note 25, at 9.

30.

See McCahery et al., supranote 29 ("The 143 respondents to our survey, mostly very large institutional

investors with a long-term focus, indicate that voice, especially when conducted behind the scenes, is highly
important. For example, 63% of the respondents' state that, in the past five years, they have engaged in direct

discussions with management, and 45% have had private discussions with a company's board outside of
management's presence.").

31.

Id.

32.

See David Soloman & Eugene Soltes, What Are We Meeting For? The Consequences of Private

Meetings with Investors 58 J. LAW. & ECON. 325, 331 (2016) (finding that 97% of CEOs of publicly traded firms
meet privately with investors, and a 2010 survey showed that on average CEOs and CFOs had meetings with
investors on 17 and 26 days out of the year respectively).
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and the 45 firms that it contacted about governance issues between 1992 and 1996.33 The
correspondence indicated that TIAA-CREF was generally able to secure its desired
governance change without resorting to a proxy contest: the fund reached agreements with
98% of the firms that it contacted, despite obtaining majority support in only one case.
Other studies that have evaluated the success rate of fund interventions report similar
results. 34 In addition, this past year, almost half of the S&P 500 companies that disclosed
engagement with investors also disclosed changes to their governance and practices as a
35
result of such engagement.
Second, there is evidence that institutional investors can and do use the threat of exit
as a disciplinary tool.36 One study of institutional investor engagement reports that funds
commonly use the threat of exit in conversations with management and that such threats
are successful in securing desired changes 40% of the time. 37
Third, and finally, institutional investors increasingly collaborate with other investors
The most important form of collaboration is with activist
to influence management.
large stakes in underperforming companies with the goal of
funds
buy
These
hedge funds.
improve shareholder returns. 3 9 These interventions range
that
would
changes
agitating for
from minor policy changes, such as instituting stock buybacks or dividend payments, to
large-scale efforts, such as pressuring the company to sell itself or replace members of the
board of directors. Because of their concentrated stakes in companies and compensation
structure that allows managers to recoup a substantial fraction of the profits from an
intervention, activist hedge funds have strong incentives to improve the value of their
investment. 40
As such, whether the activist hedge fund should be welcomed as a beneficial force for
discipline or spurned as a corporate raider has been debated extensively. Critics, including
the Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, contend that activist hedge funds push
for policies skewed to their own short-term interests, without sufficiently weighing whether
those policies create too little long-term investment or too much leverage and externality

33. Willard T. Carleton et al., The Influence of Institutions on Corporate Governance through Private
Negotiations:Evidencefrom TIAA-CREF, 53 J. FIN. 1335 (1998).
34. See Elroy Dimson et al., Active Ownership, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. (2015); Marco Becht et al., Returns to
ShareholderActivism: Evidence From a ClinicalStudy of the Hermes UK Focus Fund, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3093
(2010); Michael Smith, ShareholderActivism by InstitutionalInvestors: Evidencefrom CalPERS, 51 J. FIN. 227
(1996).
2015),
EY
(June
2015,
Season
from
Proxy
Takeaways
35. Four
http://www.ey.com/Publicaion/vwLUAssets/EY-four-takeaways-from-proxy-season-2015/$File/EY-fourtakeaways-from-proxy-season-2015.pdf.
36. Although exit becomes costlier as an investor's stake increases, it is not impossible-market analytics
show that institutional investors routinely decrease their stake in underperforming companies. See Strine Jr., Can
We Do Better?, supra note 5, at 479 n.87.
37. See McCahery et al., supra note 29.
38. Such communication became possible in 1999, when the SEC adopted Rule 14a-12, which allows
investors to communicate with an unlimited number of shareholders. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-12 (1999); Thomas
W. Briggs, CorporateGovernance and the New Hedge Fund Activism: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 32 J. CORP. L.
681, 687-88 (2007).
39. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 27, at 1045.
40. See Bebchuk et al., Agency Problems, supra note 26.
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risk.41
This advocacy has led to increased regulatory scrutiny of activist hedge funds.42
In spite of skepticism from academics and regulators, the empirical evidence generally
shows a sustained increase in firm value following an activist intervention, as well as more
innovation and improved firm performance.43 This may be because the activists who are
willing to bear the high costs associated with an activist campaign are those that will reap
substantial gains from activism, perhaps because a company is very badly managed. And
it may also be because of the involvement of institutional investors, which have become a
"keel" for hedge fund activism.44
At the outset, an activist investor knows that it will be critical to secure the support of
institutional investors if the campaign is to succeed. When an activist launches a campaign,
it rarely purchases enough stock to control voting outcomes-for campaigns launched in

41.

See Strine Jr., Can We Do Better?, supra note 5, at 458-59 (contending that empowering investors with

short-term investment horizons will compromise long-term value); Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 5, at 1290-92
(2008) (arguing that activist investors' push for short-term benefits may harm long-term shareholders); Iman

Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About IncreasingShareholderPower, 53 UCLA L. REv. 561, 579 (2006) (explaining
that active funds alter their investment positions with high frequency and seek to profit from short-term

fluctuations in price without regard to a company's long-term profits); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Responses:
DirectorPrimacy and ShareholderDisempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1751 (2006) (noting that activist

investors are the stockholders most likely to take advantage of increased stockholder power and most likely to
misuse that power for their own purposes); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against

ShareholderEmpowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 653, 726-27 (2010) (contending that "managing to the market is
the problem that needs to be addressed" and linking the 2008 financial crisis to shareholder pressures to focus on
short-term price increases); Martin Lipton, Twenty-Five Years After Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom:

Old Battles, New Attacks and the Continuing War, 60 Bus. LAW. 1369, 1377 (2005) (contending that activist
shareholders do not consider long-term interests of corporation or shareholders as a whole). See generally Strine
Jr., One FundamentalCorporate Governance Question, supra note 24, at 1 (explaining the difficulty of ensuring
that corporations are managed to promote long-term growth when most shareholders hold shares for only a short
time).

42.

The SEC has focused recent insider trading suits on hedge funds. Kevin S. Haeberle & M. Todd

Henderson, Information-DisseminationLaw: The Regulation of How Market-Moving Information Is Revealed,

101 CORNELL L. REv. 1373, 1386 (2016). In addition, the SEC's somewhat recent adoption of Regulation FD is
widely viewed by corporate officers and directors as an obstacle to more robust communication between
management and shareholders. See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(2)(ii) (2011); Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Constraints on Shareholder Activism in the United States and Slovenia 16 (May 17, 2000) (unpublished
manuscript), https://ssm.com/abstract=228780 (contending that Regulation FD will chill communications
between management and large shareholders). Recently, the SEC has received requests to shorten the Schedule
13D disclosure window and broaden the definition of beneficial share ownership to cover purely economic

positions generated by derivative trades. Gilson & Gordon, supranote 5, at 914-15; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert
J. Jackson, Jr., The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 39 (2012). These
proposals, if enacted, would substantially reduce the returns to activist shareholders by reducing the economic
stake that an activist shareholder can accumulate before news of its presence drives up the price of the target
company's stock. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 914-15; Bebchuk & Jackson, Jr., at 39.
43. See supra note 25 and accompanying text; Gantchev et al., Governance Under the Gun: Spillover

Effects

of

Hedge

Fund

Activism

(December

2017)

(unpublished

manuscript),

https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2356544 [hereinafter Gantchev et al., Governance Under
the Gun]; Bray et al., The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: Productivity, Asset Allocation, and Industry

Concentration, 28 REV. FIN. STuD. 2723, 2728-31 (2015).
44. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5 (describing a "happy complementarity" between hedge fund
activists and institutional investors in which the activist frames and seeks to force governance changes and will
succeed only if the proposal can attract broad support from sophisticated institutional investors).
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2015, the median percentage ownership of the activist investor or group of investors was
less than 7%, and less than 3% at companies with a market capitalization of over $20
billion. 45 Therefore, to succeed in proxy contests (or better yet, to secure a favorable
settlement with management and avoid the expense of a proxy contest, which may cost
upwards of $10 million),46 the activist hedge fund must secure the support of large
institutional investors. 47
Accordingly, activist hedge funds engage in rigorous investor analysis before
deciding to target a firm. If the fund decides that there are too many unfriendly institutional
shareholders, it is unlikely to intervene.48 If the fund chooses to carry out the campaign, it
will go to great lengths to make its case to large institutional investors, generally after it
has alerted the market to its presence with a Schedule 13D filing. 49 The activist fund may
also recruit other small hedge funds before or after the announcement in a phenomenon
known as "wolf-packing." 50
Ultimately, the fund knows it is critical to secure the support of one or more
institutional investors.51 Doing so will not only help the activist accumulate voting power,
but will also signal credibility to other investors, making it more likely that they will join
52
in supporting the activist campaign.

2016 U.S. ShareholderActivism Review and Analysis: Activists Face Headwindsin 2016, SULLIVAN

&

45.

2016),
28,
(Nov.
CROMWELL
https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SCPublication_2016_U.S._ShareholderActivismReview_a
ndAnalysis.pdf [hereinafter 2016 U.S. ShareholderActivism Review].
46.

Gantchev, supra note 25, at 9.

47.
48.

See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 897-900.
Empirical evidence shows that activist hedge funds typically target companies with a high level of

institutional ownership, consistent with theory that activists are more likely to intervene when they can easily
accumulate voting support. See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolfat the Door: The Impact ofHedge

Fund Activism on Corporate Governance 28-39 (Columbia Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 521, 2015). A
recent study likewise reveals that the presence of "activism-friendly" institutional investors increases the

likelihood that a firm will be targeted for hedge fund activism; accordingly, the presence of activism-unfriendly
institutional investors decreases the likelihood of becoming a target. Simi Kedia et al., Institutional Investors and

manuscript), https://editorialexpress.com/cgi(Nov. 2016) (unpublished
Hedge Fund Activism
bin/conference/download.cgi?dbname=AFA2018&paperjid=342.
49. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(a) (2012) (requiring any person acquiring beneficial ownership ofany equity
security of more than 5% to file with SEC statement on Schedule 13D within ten days after acquisition). As just
one recent example, the activist hedge fund Jana Partners gauged potential support from large institutional

investors before making demands of management at Agrium. See David Gelles & Michael J. De la Merced, New
Alliances in the Battle for Corporate Control, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
18, 2014, 9:40 PM),
see also Coffee Jr.
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/03/18/new-alliances-in-battle-for-corporate-control/?r-0;
& Palia, supra note 48; Mario Becht et al., supra note 34 (suggesting shareholder activism is predominantly
executed through private interventions both with target management and with other institutions).
50. See Susan Pulliam et al., Activist Investors Often Leak Their Plans to a Favored Few: Strategically

Placed Tips Help Build Alliances for Campaigns at Target Companies, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 26, 2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SBl0001424052702304888404579381250791474792; Coffee Jr. & Palia, supra
note 48; Briggs, supra note 38, at 686-94.
51. As an example, the activist hedge fund ValueAct was successful in obtaining a seat on Microsoft's
board with less than 1% of stock because Microsoft recognized that other large institutional investors supported
the fund's demand. See Gelles & De Ia Merced, supra note 49.
52.

Ian Appel et al., Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: The Effect of Passive Investors on Activism 2

(NBER, Working Paper No. 22707, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22707 [hereinafter Appel et al.,
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As soon as the activist's Schedule 13D becomes public, however, management will
begin a campaign of its own in an attempt to convince institutional investors that the
activist's plan is short-sighted or problematic for other reasons. In fact, such lobbying may
occur even before an activist intervenes-there is evidence that management views
enhanced communications with large shareholders as an important defense to hedge fund
activism. 53
Therefore, even though institutional investors are unlikely to take an activist position
themselves, they play an important role in catalyzing hedge fund activist campaigns. And
institutional investors will occasionally initiate an activist campaign by contacting hedge
funds and informing them about underperforming portfolio companies in the hope that a
fund will intervene. 54 For these reasons, management knows that when institutional
investors are unhappy, there is a real risk of displacement. And the very threat of this
partnership can be sufficient to induce management to focus on maximizing shareholder
wealth.
Institutional investors also discipline hedge fund activists: because of their voting
power, they are able to block interventions that they deem to be detrimental to the longterm health of the company. Accordingly, activists have begun to adjust their tactics to
match the priorities of institutional investors. For years, hedge fund activists had focused
on pushing for changes in business strategy, balance sheet changes, divestitures, or selling
the company.56 The more recent trend in proxy contests is to focus on board-related
governance issues-issues that mutual funds favor-and balance sheet campaigns have
fallen by the wayside.5 7 More study is required to determine whether the presence of
institutional investors is responsible for this shift and whether these changes have
benefitted shareholders. But perhaps some of the evidence indicating that hedge fund
activist interventions generally increase firm value can be explained by institutional
investors, who are unlikely to support changes that do not benefit their long-term investors.
In sum, although institutional investors' incentives are imperfect, there is evidence
that the presence of large, sophisticated investors with a financial interest in the long-term

Standing on the Shoulders of Giants].
53. See The Swinging Pendulum: Board Governance in the Age of ShareholderEmpowerment, PWC 15
(Oct. 2016), http://www.lexissecuritiesmosaic.com/gateway/sec/speech/assets-pwc-2016-annual-corporatedirectors--survey.pdf [hereinafter The Swinging Pendulum] (noting that "nearly four of five directors say their

board took proactive steps to prepare for actual or potential activism. About half say their board regularly
communicated with the companies' largest investors and used a stock-monitoring service to provide regular

updates about changes to company ownership .... A number of directors also say their board took action by
revising executive compensation plans or changing board composition (21% and 16%, respectively).").

54.

According to Bill Ackman, founder of activist fund Pershing Square Capital, "Periodically, we are

approached by large institutions who are disappointed with the performance of companies they are invested in to

see if we would be interested in playing an active role in effectuating change." He reports that institutional
investors even use an informal term for this phenomenon: "R.F.A." or request for activist. See Gelles & De la
Merced, supra note 49.
55. See Gantchev et al., Governance Under the Gun, supra note 43 (finding that managers of peer firms
view activism in their industry as a threat and undertake real policy changes to mitigate it); The Swinging
Pendulum, supra note 53, at 15 (noting that four out of five directors say that the board took proactive steps,
including altering compensation plans, identifying strategic vulnerabilities, and changing the board compensation
to reduce the risk of becoming a target of activism).

56.
57.

S&C 2016 U.S. ShareholderActivism, supranote 45.
Fichtner et al., supra note 24, at 298-99.
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health of portfolio companies has become an important corporate governance safeguard.
III. THE THREAT OF PASSIVE INVESTING
We are entering a new investment era brought on by the rise of passive investing that
has changed the corporate landscape once again. And the concentration of assets in passive
funds will create a far greater agency problem than has been previously encounteredshareholders will be ceding control to investors with no financial incentive to invest in
monitoring management or securing good governance.
This Part begins by documenting the steep increase in assets invested in passive funds.
It then describes the acute incentive problems facing passive funds and presents evidence
supporting the theory that passive investing has the potential to distort corporate
governance and worsen agency costs at public companies.
A. The Rise ofPassive Investing
Passive funds are funds whose investment securities are not chosen because of their
performance, but are instead automatically selected and weighted to match an index or
other subset of the market. Passive funds include index funds and ETFs, both of which seek
to replicate stock indices while minimizing expense ratios. Although passive fund
managers may initially exercise some judgment in creating the fund by setting the
philosophy of their portfolio and then determining how to track the index, the fund's
trading decisions are largely automated. For this reason, passive funds generally charge
58
much lower fees than active funds.
Passive funds have been around for a while-the modem index fund was launched in
the mid-1970s by John Bogle,59 the founder of the Vanguard Group-for over forty years,
academics have touted their benefits for investors.60 Studies comparing active and passive
funds likewise indicate that the majority of active funds have not been able to consistently
generate higher returns than benchmark indices such as the S&P 500.61 When they do, any
58. As of the end of 2015, the asset-weighted average net expense ratio was only 0.12% for U.S. passive
equity index funds, compared to 0.79% for U.S. actively managed equity funds. Patricia Oey, Average Fund Costs
Continued to Decline in 2015, But Investors Are Not Necessarily Paying Less, MORNINGSTAR (Apr. 26, 2016),
http://corporatel.momingstar.com/ResearchArticle.aspx?documentId=750768.
59. See Zweig, supra note 2 (explaining the history of index funds). In the 1930s, there existed something
very similar to the modem index mutual funds: fixed trusts, which had redeemable shares and fixed portfolios.
But for unknown reasons, they declined in popularity by the 1940s. See John Morley, Collective Branding and
the Origins of Investment Fund Regulation, 1936-1942, 6 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 341 (2012) (discussing the origins
of investment funds).
60. In 1976, John Langbein and Richard Posner first advocated for an indexing approach, concluding that
"the trustee's rational strategy. is to buy shares in a mutual fund or other investment vehicle that holds the market
portfolio-a market fund. Their advantages [of market funds] seem decisive: at any given risk/return level,
diversification is maximized and investment costs minimized." John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Market
Funds and Trust-Investment Law, AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1, 19, 30 (1976).
61. See William F. Sharpe, Mutual Fund Performance, 39 J. BUS. 119, 137 (1966) (finding that a sample
of stock mutual funds underperformed the Dow Jones Industrial Average on a risk-adjusted basis); Michael C.
Jensen, Risk, The Pricing of CapitalAssets, and The Evaluation of Investment Portfblios, 42 J. Bus. 167, 239
(1969) (finding that mutual funds, on a risk-adjusted basis, had lower net returns than the market as a whole);
Martin J. Gruber, Another Puzzle: The Growth in Actively Managed Funds, 52 J. FIN. 783, 787 (1996) (finding
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increase in returns is often eaten away by higher management fees. 62
But only very recently have investors embraced passive investing, and they have done
so wholeheartedly. Between 2008 and 2015, investors sold holdings of actively managed
mutual funds worth rough1 $800 billion, while at the same time buying approximately $1
trillion in passive funds. This past year alone, investors withdrew $340 billion from
actively managed funds and invested $533 billion into passive funds, increasing the total
amount of assets invested in passive funds by 9%.64 Assets under management in passive
funds now represent $4 trillion, or 34% of the U.S. mutual fund market, up from just 4%
in 1995.65 And in the past ten years, the share of total U.S. market capitalization held by
passively managed funds has quadrupled to more than 8%, or 12% of the S&P 500.66
Figure 1: Net Flows of U.S. Stock Market and Exchange TradedFunds67
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that actively managed funds had annual returns that were 65 basis points below the applicable market indices);
Russ Wermers, Mutual Fund Performance: An Empirical Decomposition into Stock-Picking Talent, Style,
TransactionsCosts, and Expenses, 55 J. FIN. 1655 (2000) (finding that actively managed funds hold stocks that
outperform the market, but on a net basis underperform indices by 1%); Javier Gil-Bazo & Pablo Ruiz-Verdfi,
The Relation Between Price and Performance in the Mutual Fund Industry, 64 J. FIN. 2153 (2009) (finding
underperformance of 21 to 71 basis points, depending on the set of controls).
62. Id.; Jeff Schwartz, Reconceptualizing Investment Management Regulation, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV.

521, 550-51 (2009) ("[Wlhen [active managed funds'] higher costs are taken into account, the average actively
managed dollar under-performs a passively managed index of securities. This account leaves open the possibility
that some actively managed funds will beat the market . .. Much, however, conspires against the average investor
picking out consistently above-average performers. Investing in an actively managed mutual fund is betting on
one horse in a very crowded field .. . According to one study, over a fifteen-year period, 84% of actively managed
mutual funds failed to yield returns in excess of the stock market as a whole.").

63.

Fichtner et al., supra note 24, at 298-99.

64.

See MorningstarDirectAssets, supra note 1.

65.

Id. at 6.

66. Ian Appel et al., Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners, 121 J. FIN. ECON. 111 (2016) [hereinafter
Appel et al., Passive Investors].
67.
Why
Passive Investing is
Overruning Active,
in Five Charts, WALL
ST.
J.,
http://www.wsj.com/graphics/passive-investing-five-charts/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2018).
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Actively managed funds, on average,
This rapid growth is predicted to continue.
have continued to underperform compared to market indices, making passive funds look
especially appealing.69 And because global economic growth rates are expected to remain
low, low fee passive funds will continue to have a competitive advantage. 70 Accordingly,
Ernst & Young has forecasted annual growth rates for the ETF industry of between 1530% in the next few years.71 PricewaterhouseCoopers predicts even more dramatic growth,
estimating that assets invested in ETFs will double annually until 2020.72
Regulatory scrutiny of mutual fund fees has also fueled the growth of passive funds.
In April 2016, the Department of Labor (DOL) issued a final rule expanding the
"investment advice fiduciary" definition under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA).73 That rule, which went into effect on June 9, 2017, requires
investment advisers to act as fiduciaries when making recommendations or giving advice
on 401(k) plans or individual retirement accounts (IRAs). 74 Similarly, in June 2016, the
SEC's Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations announced that SEC examiners
will scrutinize whether advisors have conflicts of interest when making recommendations
about share classes to their clients. 75 The announcement makes clear that an investment
advisor fails to uphold its fiduciary duty when it causes a client to purchase a more
expensive share class when a less expensive share class is available.76 And this enhanced
scrutiny from the DOL and SEC, combined with an uptick in litigation challenging mutual

68. See Madison Marriage, Large Investors Pull $350bn From Active Equity Funds, FIN. TIMES. (Dec. 10,
2016), https://www.ft.com/content/4418502e-be2e-l le6-8b45-b8b81dd5dO8O (describing the actively managed
fund industry's bleak future).
69. Fichtner et al., supranote 24, at 302-04.
70. Sarah Krouse, Investors Leave Active Funds Despite Fee Cuts, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 6, 2017, 5:10 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/active-funds-fee-cutting-doesnt-stem-investor-exodus- 1483376271.
(2015),
EY
Beyond,
and
2015
ETF
Survey:
Global
71. EY
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-global-etf-survey-2015-and-beyond/$FILE/ey-etf-survey-2015and-beyond.pdf.
72. Judith Evans & Jonathan Eley, DemocratisingFinance: How Passive Funds Changed Investing, FIN.
TIMES. (2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b3cOc960-a56c-1 I e4-bfl 1-001 44feab7de.html.
73. See Definition of the Term "Fiduciary"; Conflict of Interest Rule-Retirement Investment Advice, 81
Fed. Reg. 20946, 20945 (Apr. 8, 2016) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, 2550).
74. See Tara Siegel Bernard, Obama'sFiduciaryRule, After a Delay, Will Go Into Effect, N.Y. TIMES (May
23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/23/business/obamas-fiduciary-rule-after-a-delay-will-go-intoeffect.html?_r-0. The rule was originally scheduled to be phased in beginning on April 10, 2017, but the start
date was delayed until June 9, 2017, with full implementation required by July 1, 2019. Many observers wonder
whether the delay may be extended indefinitely. See, e.g., Ashlea Abeling, Will DOL Gut FiduciaryRule By
5:03
PM),
2017,
9,
(Aug.
FORBES
Extension?,
1,
2019
July
Latest
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/2017/08/09/will-dol-gut-fiduciary-rule-by-latest-july-1-2019extension/#2779d4365840.
75. Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, OCIE's 2016 Share Class Initiative, SEC (July
13, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/ocie/announcement/ocie-risk-alert-2016-share-class-initiative.pdf.
76. Id.
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fund fees, 77 has encouraged investment advisors begin moving IRA assets-which
represent $7 trillion-out of actively managed funds and into passive funds. 78
The surge in demand for passive funds has benefitted some institutional investors more
than others. That is because the passive fund industry is remarkably concentratedBlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street (the "Big Three") together hold 70% of the ETF
market. 79 Index fund market share data are not publically available, but recent estimates
put Vanguard as holding 75% of the market. 80
As a result of the growth of passive investing, the Big Three have become significant
players in governance. In 2015, the Big Three together constituted the largest owner of
nearly 90% of public companies in the S&P 500, which is up from 25% in 2000.81 When
considering all listed companies in the U.S., together the Big Three were the single largest
shareholder at least 40% of the time.82 In 2016, passive funds from just one managerVanguard-controlled 5% or more of shares in 468 companies in the S&P 500. Ten years
ago, the number of companies was only three. 83
Although the cause of increased demand for passive funds is benign, some financial
commentators have predicted that the growing concentration of assets in the hands of
passive investors may have harmful market effects. One worry is that passive investing
will increase investor herding behavior and lead to more correlated market movements,
exacerbating the pro-cyclicality of financial markets.84 A related concern is that
widespread passive investment will reduce stock market pricing efficiency because certain
companies, such as those listed on the S&P 500, will always have a ready market for their
shares. Moreover, stock in companies that are not listed on an index may have fewer
85
possible buyers, causing those companies to become undervalued. Even Bogle admitted
77.

For the past ten years, the ERISA plaintiffs' bar has been aggressively challenging fund fees, with a

growing emphasis on arguing the imprudence of active management in the administration of an employee
retirement plan. See Rosen v. PrudentialRetirementIns & Annuity Co etal., 2016 WL 74924320 (D. Conn. 2016)
(rejecting plaintiff's argument that the employer's selection of higher-cost actively managed mutual funds rather

than passively managed funds violated ERISA); Taylor v. United Techs. Corp., 2009 WL 535779, at *10 (D.
Conn. Mar. 3, 2009), aff'd, 354 F. App'x 525 (2d Cir. 2009) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that the presence ofa
high concentration of mutual funds with revenue-sharing arrangements violated ERISA despite expert evidence
in support of the notion that actively-managed mutual funds generally underperform passive index funds). This
liability risk has pushed some companies to switch their retirement accounts from actively managed funds to

index funds. See, e.g., Anne Tergesen & Jason Zweig, The Dying Business ofPicking Stocks, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
17, 2016, 12:12 PM) (describing how the Illinois State Board of Investment voted to convert its $4 billion 401(k)
plan for state workers to an all-index plan in the face of increased liability risk).
78.

John Waggoner, DOL rule silver lining? It may trigger a shift of $1 trillion to ETFs, INVEST. NEWS

(Apr. 3, 2016), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20160403/FREE/304039997/dol-rule-silver-lining-itmay-trigger-a-shift-of-I -trillion-to-etfs.
79. Fichtner et al., supra note 24, at 303-04.

80.
81.
82.

Id.
Posner et al., supra note 7, at 7.
Fichtner et al., supra note 24, at 315.

83.

Dennis K. Berman & Jamie Heller, Wall Street's "Do-Nothing " Investing Revolution, WALL ST. J. (Oct

17, 2016), http://graphics.wsj.com/passivists/.
84. Andrew Haldane, Exec. Dir. Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., The Age of Asset Management? (Apr. 4,
2014), https://www.bis.org/review/rl40507d.pdf.
85. Russ Wermers & Tong Yao, Active vs. Passive Investing and the Efficiency of Individual Stock Prices
(May
2010)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://finance.uni-
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that if everyone were to index, there would be "chaos without limit. You [couldn't] buy or
sell, there [would be] no liquidity, there [would be] no market."86 But he explained that
perverse market effects would not manifest until investment in passive funds rose to about
90% of the equity market. 87
The legal literature has generally focused on a different problem created by the rise of
institutional investing-the prospect for anticompetitive behavior by institutional investors
with large ownership stakes across competitor firms. Sparked by empirical research
showing that common institutional ownership is correlated with higher prices in at least
two concentrated U.S. industries, Eric Posner, Fiona Morton, and E. Glen Weyl, as well
as Einer Elhauge, have asserted that institutional investors may pressure managers to
refrain from aggressive price competition because of their substantial interests in rival
companies. 89
The next Part provides an alternative explanation-the problem is not that institutional
investors are pressuring management to compete less aggressively, but that a growing share
of the market is not doing as much to monitor and discipline management. When those
passive investors do intervene, they will pursue an unthinking and automated approach to
governance that is unlikely to be in the company's best interest. And if this trend continues,
the scope of the problem is potentially much larger than the threat of anticompetitive
conduct because it extends beyond companies in oligopolistic industries, and concerns all
companies with a high concentration of passive ownership, which is a large and growing
segment of the U.S. market.
B. Passive Investing and CorporateGovernance
A passive fund's goal is to replicate the performance of a market index, and so the
fund's exit opportunities are limited. For this reason, one might suppose that a passive
fund's incentives are closely aligned with those of its long-term investors. 90 But passive

mannheim.de/fileadmin/files/areafinance/files/Paper.FinanceSeminar/Wermers.pdf; Inigo Fraser-Jenkins et al.,
The Silent Road to Serfdom: Why Passive Investing is Worse Than Marxism, BERNSTEIN (Aug. 23, 2016),

https://www.scribd.com/document/323564709/Bernstein-Passive-Investing-Serfdom-Aug-2016;
Johnson,

but see Miles

Why active fund managers should cheer the rise of ETFs, FIN. TIMES. (Dec.

5, 2016),

https://www.ft.com/content/dfld95ec-bac4-1 1e6-8b45-b8b81dd5d080 (contending that actively managed funds
should view the rise of passive funds as opportunities to exploit undervalued stocks that are not suitable for

inclusion on indices).
86.

Zweig, supra note 2.

87. Id.
88. Jos6 Azar et al., Anti-Competitive Effects, supra note 12; Jos& Azar et al., Ultimate Ownership and Bank
Competition
(July
2016)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2710252. The evidence of higher prices in certain industries
is not inconsistent with my theory; indeed, Azar et al. theorize that a lack of investor demand for competition
could result in an equilibrium with reduced competition and sustained high profit margins. See Azar et al., AntiCompetitive Effects, supra note 12, at 4-5. 1 argue, however, that the potential for anticompetitive behavior is

only one facet of the problem, and that a lack of investor discipline would likely also lead to heightened agency
costs. And harmful effects would be felt not just in concentrated industries, but also across the entire market.
89. Posner et al., supra note 7; Elhauge, supra note 10.
90. See, e.g., Strine Jr., Can We Do Better?, supra note 5, at 478, stating:

Precisely because index funds do not sell stocks in their target index, those funds have a unique
interest in corporations pursuing fundamentally sound strategies that will generate the most
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funds face acute collective action and agency problems that render their thoughtful
participation in governance unlikely.
Because a passive fund seeks only to match the performance of a market index-not
outperform it-the fund lacks a financial incentive to ensure that the companies in their
portfolio are well run.91 In the first place, a passive fund portfolio is highly diversified and
therefore includes many more companies than the typical actively managed mutual fund.
For example, an S&P 500 tracker fund (one of the more popular passive fund options)
generally consists of 500 portfolio companies, more than five times the amount in the
average actively managed mutual fund.92 This means that any investment in improving
governance at a single portfolio company will be even less likely to impact the fund's
overall performance. 93
In addition, passive funds face an acute collective action problem because a beneficial
governance intervention will improve the performance of all funds tracking the index.
Unlike actively managed funds, which can modify the weight of a portfolio company based
on its expected performance and out-compete rival funds with strategic investments in
governance, passive funds hold stock in proportion to the company's weight on a market
index. A passive fund that invests in governance, therefore, would improve the
performance of all rival passive funds in equal measure. Moreover, investing in governance
would also benefit active funds-in fact, active funds are able to reap even greater benefits
from the passive fund's investment because they can overweight the target company upon
learning about the intervention. In other words, any investment in governance would
benefit competitor funds while simultaneously driving up the passive fund's costs.
Therefore, unless the intervention were costless, it would be certain to harm the passive
fund's relative performance.
But thoughtful interventions are especially costly for passive funds, which generally
lack local knowledge-'knowledge of people, of local conditions, and of special
durable wealth for stockholders. Index fund investors do not benefit by bubbles that burst.
Index fund investors also have a more durable interest in the prospects of the corporations in
the index than investors in actively traded funds. Actively traded funds turn over at a rate which
makes it difficult to believe that their managers are basing their decisions on a genuine
assessment of the corporations' long-term cash flow prospects as opposed to their speculation
about where the market is heading.
91. To understand the power of their commitment to the indexing strategy, consider that passive funds may
refuse to tender into an offer to purchase their shares at a premium, even if they view the deal as beneficial, so
long as the stock is still included in the index that the fund is tracking. That is because the gap between the offer
price and the market price, as well as the gap in time between the tender and the squeeze-out, interferes with the
fund's ability to track the index. See Some Tender Offer Quirks, KIRKLAND & ELLIS M&A UPDATE (Oct. 9, 2009),
https://www.kirkland.com/files/MAUpdate/100909.pdf
92. David M. Smith & Hany Shawky, Optimal Number ofStock Holdingsin Mutual FundPortfolios Based
on Market Performance, 40 FIN. REv. 481, tbl.2 (2005) (showing that in 2000, the mean number of companies in
a mutual fund portfolio was 92).
93. The literature has previously deemed "neutral" shareholders as those who have entered into a derivative
transaction that negates all the economic risk associated with the underlying position in its shares. See Frank
Partnoy, U.S. Hedge Fund Activism, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 13-14 (eds. Jennifer
G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas) (2015); Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Empty Voting and Hidden Ownership:
Taxonomy, Implications, and Reforms, 61 Bus. LAW. 1011 (2006). This Article expands the concept of a neutral
shareholder to include highly diversified passive fund managers who lack any incentive to invest in improving
the performance of the firms within the fund's portfolio.
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circumstances"-of the firms that they invest in. 94 Because of its automated trading
strategy, a passive fund does not monitor the fundamentals of companies in its broad
portfolio. 95 The consequence of this passive approach to trading is that a proactive and
informed approach to governance requires the passive fund to incur additional expenses
associated with identifying underperforming companies, pinpointing the reason for their
underperformance, and then determining the most effective way to intervene.96 This lowcost trading strategy also means that the fund will have to incur additional resources to
evaluate shareholder proposals and governance interventions proposed by other investors.
A passive fund that incurred these expenses would need to charge a higher fee, which
97
would likely drive fee-sensitive investors to competitor funds.
In sum, passive investing exacerbates agency and collective action problems
associated with intermediated finance-although investors desire good governance, they
are not willing to pay the fees necessary to secure it and would instead prefer to free ride
on the investments of others. The same is true for passive fund managers, who will not
invest in improving firm governance because any such investment will harm the fund's
competitiveness. Therefore, unlike active funds, passive funds have no financial incentive
to monitor management or invest in governance interventions. Or, as Bogle has explained,
historically, index funds managers rationally believed that they should leave the
performance of the companies in their portfolios to "the invisible hand of the
marketplace." 98
Therefore, as demand for passive funds continues to fuel an influx of assets from active
funds, it is likely that the market for corporate influence will experience two dramatic
changes. First, a growing share of corporate owners will have substantially weakened
incentives to monitor and discipline management or invest in improving governance.

94. Freidrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REv. 519, 522 (1945). This is
somewhat less true for index funds that sample firms in order to replicate the performance of an index-those
funds may need to readjust their portfolio if one company begins to underperform relative to the industry. But
even in that case, those funds would have no incentive to determine why the fund is underperforming and then
expend resources to try to improve firm performance.
95. Vanguard has emphasized that the funds are able to charge low fees because they do not expend
resources investigating individual companies or meeting with managers. See Frank Partnoy, Are Index Funds
Evil?, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/09/are-index-fundsevil/534183/ [hereinafter Partnoy, Are Index Funds Evil].
96. Moreover, the Big Three, by virtue of their very large stakes in many public companies, risk triggering
Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act of 1934 when they intervene in company performance. Section 13(d) subjects
investment managers with a 5% or greater investment in a company to extensive disclosure requirements. But so
long as the investment manager does not exercise "control," which includes nominating directors and waging a
proxy contest, they will be subject to much more limited disclosure requirements under Schedule 13G. See John
Morley, Too Big to Be Active: LargeInvestment Managers, Conflicts ofInterest, and the High Costs ofCorporate
Control (Working Paper) (on file with author). This rule may cause investment managers with large investments
to avoid taking any actions that could be viewed as seeking to gain influence.
97. See generally Yang Sun, The Effect of Index Fund Competition on Money Management Fees (Apr. 15,
2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2432361; Lisa Beilfuss,
Readers React: Low Fees Are Driving Us Into Passive Funds, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 24, 2016),
http://tabbforum.com/channels/fixed-income/news/readers-react-low-fees-are-driving-us-into-passive-funds.
Note that the fee-sensitivity of investors is somewhat disputed. See Erik Sirri & Peter Tufano, Costly Search and
Mutual FundFlows, 53 J. FIN. 1589 (1998).
98. Krouse et al., supra note 2.
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Second, there is the risk that passive fund voting will do more harm than good. This is
because passive fund managers will be especially likely to adhere to a low-cost, unthinking
approach to governance, such as automatically voting "yes" to any shareholder proposal
that meets pre-determined qualifications. Passive funds will also be especially likely to
succumb to their serious conflicts of interest. Most prominently, they will have an incentive
to vote with management-an important source of defined contribution plan assets, which
are a large and growing pool of capital invested in index funds. 99
Moreover, governance distortions associated with passive fund ownership will likely
materialize well before stock price inefficiencies manifest. That is because the market for
corporate influence requires more active participation to remain efficient than is necessary
to keep the stock market's pricing efficient. If only a small number of investors actively
trade based on information about the company, the stock price will incorporate that
information. But a small number of active investors cannot so easily influence governance
outcomes, meaning that governance inefficiencies arising from passive investing would
arise much sooner.100
Consider the following example: Company Y is 51% owned by passive funds and
those funds have internal guidelines that state that the funds will vote yes to any proposal
that results in greater board independence. A shareholder files a proposal that purports to
make the board of directors more independent by separating the CEO from the chairman.
The passive funds lack firm-specific knowledge and thus do not know whether this
controversial proposal would actually improve shareholder value. And yet, because passive
funds adhere to their voting guidelines closely, the proposal will pass, even if all other
active shareholders oppose it.io0
As another example, consider Company X, which is also 51% owned by passive funds.
Informed investors have decided that Company X is underperforming and that an
intervention would improve firm efficiency, but management will successfully oppose the
intervention unless a majority of shareholders support it. Let us further assume that the
intervention is not blessed by the passive funds' voting guidelines. Rather than expend
resources to determine whether the intervention is beneficial, the passive fund manager
99. In 2015, 401(k) assets under management totaled $4.7 trillion, with 60% held in mutual funds. Sean
Collins et al., The Economics of Providing 401(k) Plans: Services, Fees, and Expenses, ICI RES. PERSP. (July
2016), http://www.ici.org/pdf/per22-04.pdf; see also Simon C. Y. Wong, How Conflicts of Interest Thwart
InstitutionalInvestor Stewardship, BUTTERWORTHS J. INT'L BANKING & FIN. L. 481 (2011). And in some cases,
management has used its power as a client to send a strong message. As just one example, in 1990, Armstrong
World Industries, a strong supporter of a Pennsylvania anti-takeover law, switched its $180 million employee
savings plan to Fidelity from Vanguard after Fidelity withdrew its opposition to the new law. See Black,
ShareholderPassivity Reexamined, supra note 20, at 602.
100. Zweig, supra note 2.
101. Whether to separate the CEO and chairman positions is a hotly contested issue in corporate governance.
In recent years, the trend has consistently moved toward separation, in spite of the fact that the empirical evidence
does not find it to be unambiguously positive. David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, Chairman and CEO: The
Controversy Over Board Leadership Structure, STAN Bus.: STAN. CLOSER LOOK SERIES (June 24, 2016),
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/publication-pdf/cgri-closer-look-58-independent-chair.pdf.
In fact,
there is little evidence that separating the two positions really improves firm performance or govemance quality,
and a recent study has found that forced separation due to shareholder pressure is associated with a decrease in
market valuation and lower future operating performance. See Aiyesha Dey et al., CEO And Board ChairRoles:
To Split or Not to Split?, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 1595 (2011) (describing performance analyses of future operating
performance).
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would likely do nothing or vote with management, meaning that the intervention would
fail, even if all informed shareholders support it.
Two features of the passive fund industry dissipate some of these concerns. First,
passive funds may be able to free ride off of information from active funds housed within
the same institution. As of June 2016, Vanguard and BlackRock each had 19% of their
equity assets under management invested in actively managed funds, while State Street had
3%. 102 And when an institution has investment overlap between active and passive funds,
there is the possibility of beneficial information sharing that increases the likelihood of
informed voting. 103
As an example, last year, BlackRock's passive funds changed their vote on a high
profile merger based on advice from active fund managers. The issue was a proposed $18
billion merger between professional-service providers Towers Watson and Willis Group.
Towers Watson investors disliked the proposed terms: a package of cash and shares in the
combined company worth less than Towers' stock price on the date the deal was
announced. Yet the deal was expected to increase revenue and decrease costs for Towers
Watson, meaning that shareholders would capture the upside from the deal later.104 Both
ISS and Glass Lewis recommended a "no" vote (in a position that was called "shorttermist" by other proxy advisors)105 and BlackRock's passive team initially agreed, but the
institution's active fund portfolio managers supported the deal and eventually convinced
their colleagues to do the same.106 And because of BlackRock's change of heart, the deal
was approved by shareholders.
Information sharing can therefore reduce the risk of bad outcomes, but investment
overlap between active and passive funds is not always guaranteed. This is because active
funds invest in far fewer companies than passively managed funds. Moreover, as assets
continue to flow out of actively managed funds, causing them to close or lay off investment
analysts,1 07 there will be less generation of information and thus less beneficial spillover.
102. See Fichtner et al., supra note 24, at 304 tbl. 1.
103. For some evidence that beneficial information sharing occurs across large institutional investors, see
Michelle Lowry & Peter Iliev, Are Mutual Funds Active Voters?, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 446 (2015) (demonstrating
that, although 25% of mutual funds blindly follow ISS recommendations, larger mutual funds and funds that
belong to larger fund families engage in active voting more often and theorizing that this is because those large
funds can spread their research costs and benefits across various funds).
104. Paul J. Davies, Towers Watson-Willis Merger: Battle to Save a Dubious Deal, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 19,
2015, 11:29 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/towers-watson-willis-merger-battle-to-save-a-dubious-deal1447950545.
105. Critics React to Contentious Towers Watson Merger, CHIEF INV. OFFICER (Dec. 15, 2015),
http://www.ai-cio.com/news/critics-react-to-contentious-towers-watson-merger/.
106. Krouse et al., supranote 2.
107. This has already begun to happen at the Big Three: recently, State Street and BlackRock reported record
high layoffs even as passive funds-their primary investment vehicles -experience a record influx of assets. See
Sarah Krouse, BlackRock to Cut About 400 Jobs, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 30, 2016, 4:46 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/blackrock-to-cut-about-400-jobs-1459370775 (reporting that BlackRock plans to
cut about 400 jobs, or 3% of its workforce, in the largest round of layoffs to date); Ross Kerber, UPDATE 1-State
AM),
10:51
23,
2015,
(Oct.
cuts, REUTERS
plans job
Street net income flat,
http://www.reuters.com/article/statestreet-results-idUSLINI2N17320151023 (reporting that State Street plans to
cut 600 jobs worldwide); Deirdre Fernandes, State Street Corp. eyes 7,000 layoffs by 2020, BOST. GLOBE (Mar.
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2016/03/29/state-street-official-pegs-staff-reduction29,
2016),
workers/89HmTzw98F6AvUCVyA9A41/story.html (reporting that State Street announced at an investor
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In addition, some institutions, including Vanguard, are increasingly outsourcing active
management to third-party managers, meaning that it will be even more difficult to
leverage information from active managers.lo0 The rise of passive investing, therefore,
makes it increasingly likely that institutional investors will have a substantial passive
presence in a company without guidance from active fund managers.
The second complicating feature of the passive fund industry is the fact that largely
passive institutions, like many other large institutional investors, locate voting and
engagement efforts for passive funds in a centralized corporate governance team. 109 In
theory, a well-staffed group of engaged employees who are capable of thoughtfully
directing fund votes and engaging with management would lessen many of the concerns
identified in this Article. The following subsections describe what we know about the
structure and governance efforts of the Big Three's governance groups, which indicate that
they are not yet up to the task. They also discuss evidence indicating that the rise of passive
investing may already be distorting the outcome of shareholder votes, as well as the
substance of hedge fund activist campaigns.
]. Passivity, Voting, and Engagement
The Big Three advertise that their governance groups are active participants in firm
governance, but a closer look induces some skepticism about these claims.110 Those
governance groups do not have their pay tied to the funds' performance. 1 1 They are also

conference plans to lay off up to 7000 workers in the next three years "to become a more tech-driven company
less reliant on.. . manual trades.").
108. See Hortense Bioy & Alex Bryan, Passive Fund Providers Take an Active Approach to Investment
(Dec.
2017),
MORNINGSTAR
Stewardship,
https://corporatel.momingstar.com/ResearchLibrary/article/839413/passive-fund-providers-take-an-activeapproach-to-investment-stewardship--full-report/ (describing ways to assess the stewardship practices of asset
managers).
109. See Charles M. Nathan, The Parallel Universes of Institutional Investing and Institutional Voting,
&
FIN.
REG.
(Apr.
6,
2010),
SCH.
F.
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
HARv.
L.
https://corpgov.1aw.harvard.edul2010/04/06/the-parallel-universes-of-institutional-investing-and-institutionalvoting/ [hereinafter Nathan, The Parallel Universes] (noting that many larger investment managers have staff
dedicated to voting all portfolio companies' shares and that this staff "typically is entirely separate from the
portfolio managers and reports either to the general counsel or senior compliance officer of the investment
manager, not to the.investing function").
110. BlackRock, for example, explains that its engagement program "is focused on protecting and enhancing
the economic value of the companies in which it invests on behalf of clients" through engagement with boards
and management of investee companies. BlackRock, Global CorporateGovernance and EngagementPrinciples,
(2014),
SEC
Vanguard
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/890393/000119312515334865/d25691dex99corpgov.htm.
likewise emphasizes that it takes an active approach to engagement to "ensure that [its portfolio] companies'
policies and practices in relation to corporate governance matters support the creation of long-term value for
investors." Vanguard, Vanguard's Approach to Corporate Governance, HARV. L. SCH.: PROGRAM ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE,
https://pcg.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/2-Vanguards-approach-to-corporategovemance-_-Vanguard.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2018) [hereinafter Vanguard, Approach to Corporate
Governance];see also Global Proxy Voting and EngagementPrinciples, ST. STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS 2 (Mar.
2016), https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-social-govemance/2016/Global-Proxy-Votingand-Engagement-Principles-20160301 .pdf [hereinafter Global Proxy Voting].
111. Rock, supra note 5, at 10.
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understaffed: Vanguard employs fifteen people devoted to engagement and voting at about
13,000 companies based around the world, BlackRock employs about twenty people who
work on governance issues at some 14,000 companies, and State Street employs fewer than
ten people devoted to governance issues at around 9,000 companies.112 Put differently,
each member of Vanguard's governance team is tasked with making governance decisions
for nearly one thousand companies, even though Vanguard is likely to be one of the
company's largest shareholders.
Given the number of companies the engagement teams are charged with overseeing,
simply voting the shares, without even considering how to vote them, is an enormous
task.113 It would not be possible for teams of that size to prepare corporate governance
reports, issue and evaluate governance guidelines, research and thoughtfully vote proxies,
and also meet with management and the board. Accordingly, the engagement teams do not
use an active voting strategy and instead promulgate voting guidelines and follow them
closely.114 They also outsource voting decisions to proxy advisor services: BlackRock
reports that its governance team relies on ISS and Glass Lewis to cast votes for routine
matters and devotes close analysis only when those services have identified an issue.115
State Street and Vanguard similarly utilize ISS as a voting agent and a provider of research
for certain proxy issues.1 16
In spite of the fact that there are no generally accepted best practices for governance,
the Big Three have adopted nearly identical voting guidelines: each institution articulates
a preference for director independence; some relationship between long-term company
performance and executive compensation; and skepticism about anti-takeover provisions
and major changes to the corporation, such as mergers, reorganizations, or changes to
capital structure.1 17 SEC regulations shed some light on the topics chosen for inclusion. In
2003, when announcing that investment managers have a fiduciary obligation to vote
proxies responsibly and in the interests of their investors, the SEC provided guidance on
appropriate topics for mutual fund voting guidelines:
The following are examples of specific types of issues [for] which disclosure
would be appropriate [in the voting guidelines]: [c]orporate governance matters,
including changes in the state of incorporation, mergers and other corporate
112. Krouse et al., supranote 2. On the opposite end of the spectrum is activist hedge fund Pershing Square
Capital Management that has an investment team of eight, as well as several additional employees, that together
oversee a portfolio of twelve companies. Id.
113. See Strine Jr., Can We Do Better?, supra note 5, at 475 (explaining that institutional investors holding
broad portfolios are required to cast thousands of votes every year).
114. See Bioy & Bryan, supra note 108.
115. Craig, supra note 29.
116. GlobalProxy Voting, supra note 110, at 3; Eleanor Bloxham, ShareholderResearch FirmsAre Not the
Enemy, FORTUNE (Mar. 19, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/03/19/shareholder-research-firms-are-not-theenemy/. One might conclude that this delegation is beneficial, but proxy advisors themselves adhere to one-sizefits-all voting policies, lack a financial interest in the portfolio company, and suffer from conflicts of interest that
undermine the value of their proxy voting guidance. See Charles M. Nathan, Proxy Advisory Business: Apotheosis
23,
2011),
REG.
(Mar.
CORP.
Gov.
& FIN.
L.
SCH.
F.
HARV.
or Apogee?,
[hereinafter
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/201 1/03/23/proxy-advisory-business-apotheosis-or-apogee/
Nathan, Proxy Advisory Business]; Robert M. Krasne, Proxy- Voting Concern, PENSIONS & INV. (May 31, 2004),
http://www.pionline.com/article/20040531/PRINTSUB/405310706/1026/TOC.
117. Id.; BlackRock, supra note 110; Vanguard, Approach to CorporateGovernance, supra note 110.
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restructurings, and anti-takeover provisions such as staggered boards, poison
pills, and supermajority provisions; [c]hanges to capital structure, including
increases and decreases of capital and preferred stock issuance; [s]tock option
plans and other management compensation issues; and [s]ocial and corporate
responsibility issues. 118
On the substance of each of these issues, the Big Three's voting guidelines generally follow
recommendations from proxy advisors like ISS and Glass Lewis, which likewise embrace
one-size-fits-all voting policies. 1 19
The Big Three closely adhere to their voting guidelines and are thus able to achieve
lock-step consistency in voting across funds. At BlackRock in 2015, one of their funds did
not vote along with the other funds in only 18 per 100,000 of shareholder proposals. 120
Likewise, at Vanguard, only 6 out of 100,000 proposals featured a fund voting differently
than its other funds.121 State Street also showed a low level of internal disagreement, voting
inconsistently in 195 per 100,000 proposals.122 By contrast, Fidelity (which has only 16%
of its equity invested in passive funds) had internal disagreement in 3,144 of 100,000
votes.123 This higher degree of inconsistency is likely due to the fact that institutions with
a greater share of active investments, like Fidelity, tend to give active fund managers
freedom to cast the fund's votes, and different fund managers will reasonably reach
different conclusions for controversial proposals or have varying perspectives based on the
differing needs of their investors.124 And it indicates that the centralized voting strategy
utilized by passive funds may not be in the best interests of all investors.
In light of their growing market share and uniform preferences, it is not surprising that
the Big Three may already be influencing election outcomes. The first and only study to
consider this issue shows that an increase in passive fund ownership is correlated with a
higher likelihood of implementation of the shareholder governance proposals that are

118. See Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management
Investment Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564, 6567 (Feb. 7, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 249, 270, 274).
119. See Nathan, Proxy Advisory Business, supra note 116 ("[A]s everyone connected with the institutional
shareholder voting process knows or should know, proxy advisors' voting recommendations are driven by

inflexible, one-size-fits-all voting policies and simplistic analytic models designed to utilize standard and easily
accessible inputs that can be derived from readily available data and to avoid any need for particularized research
or the application of meaningful judgment.").

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Fichtner et al., supra note 24, at 316-17.
Id.
Id.
Id.
BlackRock is the only one of Big Three that allows its active funds to vote differently than the rest of

the institution, but "this happens very seldom." See Bioy & Bryan, supra note 108, at 26. Vanguard and State
Street do not allow any divergence in voting, although active portfolio managers can provide input. Id. at 42, 46.

"Index portfolio managers, meanwhile, have no say in the voting of their portfolio holdings." Id. at 14.
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favored by the Big Three, including proposals that increase board independence, remove
poison pills and other takeover defenses,125 and eliminate dual class structures. 126
We should be wary of this trend. Decades of scholarship have failed to generate
consensus about what good governance is, concluding that it is endogenous to the particular
firm. And there is reason to believe that one-size-fits-all governance solutions imposed
across vastly different finns will make all firms worse off. For example, a recent study
finds a statistically negative impact on stock price as the result of certain compensation
changes made in response to comments from proxy advisory firms.127 Another study
reports similar results after the implementation of stock option exchange programs
128
recommended by ISS.
125. One could argue that passive funds strategically remove takeover defenses in the hope that the external
threat of a takeover will discipline management and obviate the need for shareholder monitoring. But there are

problems with this argument. First, a hostile takeover is a very expensive option-"only a badly mismanaged
target can justify the typical 50% takeover premium." Black, ShareholderPassivity Reexamined, supra note 20,
at 522. Hostile takeovers also face strong legal obstacles, most notably, state antitakeover statutes. See Guhan
Subramanian et al., Is Delaware'sAntitakeover Statute Unconstitutional?:Evidencefrom 1988-2008, 65 BUS.

LAW. 685 (2010). Large public companies are especially unlikely to be the targets of hostile takeovers in light of
the expense and regulatory hurdles of purchasing control. Finally, purchasing control is often more than is
necessary to correct a problem: for companies with competent managers who could benefit from closer oversight,
a takeover is a disproportionate remedy and one that creates large disruption and transaction costs. Black,
ShareholderPassivity Reexamined, supra note 20, at 522.
126. Appel et al., PassiveInvestors, supranote 66, at 4-5. This same study revealed that although institutions

with a higher share of passive fund assets vote with management almost always, the number is slightly lower than
it is for funds with a high percentage of assets in active funds. Id. But this result does not necessarily prove that
passive funds are active voters-to the contrary, it is also consistent with the theory that passively managed funds
follow their voting guidelines or defer to proxy advisors even when the better choice is to vote with management.

The study also found that an increase in passive ownership was correlated with a slight increase in a
company's return on assets. Id. at 6. The authors suggest that this evidence indicates that passive fund ownership
was the reason for these beneficial changes, but there are other explanations: for example, companies with higher
concentration of passive fund ownership often have a high concentration of active fund ownership, too. See K.J.
Martijn Cremers & Quinn Curtis, Do Mutual Investors Get What They Pay For? SecuritiesLaw and Closet Index

Funds, II VA. L. Bus. REV. 31 (2016) (showing that a number of high fee active funds in fact hold portfolios that
substantially overlap with market indices); see also Audra Boone & Joshua White, The Effect ofInstitutional
Ownership on Firm Transparency and Information Production, 117 J. FIN. ECON. 508 (2015) (finding that the

large difference in institutional ownership at the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff is driven by a difference in both passive
and active ownership); See Alan Crane et al., The Effect of InstitutionalOwnership on Payout Policy: Evidence
from Index Thresholds, 29 REV. FIN. STUDIES 1377 (2016). Although Cremers and Curtis characterize "closet
indexing," which occurs when active funds largely track an index with the exception of a few big bets, as an
abusive practice, this Article shows that it may provide a benefit. If closet index fund managers are motivated to
act as stewards of portfolio companies in order to determine which companies should be overweighted relative to
the index, all investors will benefit from this investment.
In sum, the fact that active funds may also favor companies that are listed on indices may drive some of
performance results found in the Appel study. But as investors continue to shift assets from active to passive
funds, this protection may recede.
127. See generally Larcker et al., Outsourcing ShareholderVoting, supra note 24. Other studies have found

similar results. See Pay Governance LLC, Do ProxyAdvisors Say On Pay Voting PoliciesImprove TSR?, HARV.
L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr. 20, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/04/20/doproxy-advisors-say-on-pay-voting-policies-improve-tsr/.

128.
Ctr.

for

See David Larcker et al., Proxy Advisory Firms and Stock Option Exchanges: The Case ofISS (Rock
Corp.

Governance,

Working

Paper

No.100,

2011),

https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-

research/working-papers/proxy-advisory-firms-stock-option-exchanges-case-institutional.

2018]

The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting

519

But voting is only part of the story. As discussed, engagement is perceived by
institutional investors to be the most important and effective way to influence and
discipline management, but it is also the most resource-intensive. How do engagement
efforts by the Big Three fare? Engagement is difficult to evaluate, but Vanguard and
BlackRock both report the number of meetings with management annually: in 2015,
BlackRock reported 1,421 engagements worldwide.129 About a third of these constituted
engagements with U.S. companies, and only 13% were categorized as "extensive" (as
opposed to "moderate" or "basic").130 Likewise, Vanguard reported 800 worldwide
engagements, or "conversations," with management and directors (State Street does not
report engagement data). 131
These numbers appear high, but they indicate that the vast majority of portfolio
companies-at least 12,200 in the case of Vanguard-were neglected. These engagement
efforts are also dwarfed by those of institutional investors that favor an active investing
strategy. For example, in 2015, Fidelity International, a small institutional investor with an
active investment approach (not to be confused with Fidelity Investments, which does not
report its annual engagements),132

reported 1,001 engagements conducted by its
governance and engagement team.133 But that number does not include over 16,000
company meetings and visits by analysts and other employees as part of "the normal
conduct of [their] business."l34 T. Rowe Price, a large institutional investor that invests
only 8.9% of its assets under management in passive funds similarly reports that the
majority of meetings are "driven by portfolio managers and supported by the expertise
of ...
industry-focused analysts," and that corporate engagements merely supplement due
diligence meetings conducted by analysts in the ordinary course of investing.135
In other words, active fund analysts, not members of corporate governance teams, are
the primary drivers of informal meetings and interactions with management. The rise of
passive investing is therefore likely to affect not only proxy voting outcomes, but also the

129. Investment Stewardship Report: Voting and Engagement Quarterly Statistics, BLAcKROCK (2016),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-br/literature/fact-sheet/blk-voting-engagement-annual-figures-q2-

2015-ql-2016.pdf.
130. Id.
131. Our Engagement Efforts and Proxy Voting: An Update, VANGUARD (June 30, 2016),
https://about.vanguard.com/vanguard-proxy-voting/update-on-voting/index.html. Vanguard explains that its

index funds are able to charge low fees because fund managers need not incur the costs of meeting with
companies. Indeed, according to a Vanguard representative, index fund managers never engage with companies

about their businesses because doing so would require the fund to make new regulatory filings and change their
investment guidelines. See Partnoy, Are Index Funds Evil, supra note 95.
132. Fidelity International has $290 billion in assets under management. See About Us, FIDELITY INT'L,
https://www.fidelityinternational.com/global/about/default.page? (last visited Mar. 12, 2018).
133. Governance
and
Engagement
Report,
FIDELITY
INT'L
(2015),
http://www.fidelityilf.com/assets/pdf/governance-engagement-report.pdf. By contrast, Vanguard has $4 trillion
assets under management and BlackRock, $5 trillion. Sarah Krouse, VanguardReaches $4 Trillionfor FirstTime,

WALL ST. J. (Feb. 10, 2017, 6:40 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/vanguardreaches-4-trillion-for-first-time1486745349.
134. Id.
135. Building
on
Our
Values,
T.
ROWE
PRICE
(2014),
https://www3.troweprice.com/usis/content/dam/trowecorp/Pdfs/CSRReport2O14.pdf.
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occurrence and efficacyl36 of investor meetings with management-perhaps the most
important form of institutional investor influence.137 When that happens, fewer agreements
will be reached in back room conversations; instead, investor influence, when it occurs at
all, will come in the form of costly proxy contests.
2. Passivityand Hedge Fund Activism
As the composition of institutional investors moves toward passivity, in theory, those
investors will also be less likely to serve as a keel to hedge fund activism.138 Recall that
active funds generally have the incentive and ability to evaluate activist interventions and
then catalyze those that are deemed beneficial, while refusing to support those that are not
in the interests of their long-term investors.
Passive funds, again, are different. Even the most beneficial intervention will not
improve the passive fund's relative performance, nor will it materially improve portfolio
returns. Thus, a passive fund manager is unlikely to support an activist unless doing so is
costless. But there are a few reasons to think that partnering with an activist would be
expensive for passive funds. First, because passive funds lack information about the
company and its performance, they would need to invest time and resources to evaluate the
activist's proposal. Second, supporting an activist would cause the fund to incur the costs
of interfacing with management and potentially participating in litigation.139
Third, a passive fund manager will likely worry that supporting an activist could
jeopardize her relationship with the target company and put the fund at risk of losing
corporate pension fund assets.1 40 Not only that, the company might be a client for the
institution's investment services.141 And because securities law requires funds to disclose

136. In addition to being infrequent, engagement by passive funds is relatively ineffective because passive
funds lack a credible exit threat: their indexing strategy often requires them to hold stock regardless of the
company's performance. Indeed, the prospect of tracking error might even force passive fund managers to buy in
situations where they would prefer to sell. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 29, at 16.
137. As an example, Schwab's passive index management group refuses to set up an engagement program
because the costs would vastly exceed the benefits. See Bioy & Bryan, supra 108, at 15 (summarizing Schwab's
position that "it would be difficult to engage with companies in a consistent and scalable way and that there isn't
a clear benefit to [passive fund] investors that would justify the expense"). As discussed, the Big Three take a
different view, although they fail to meaningfully engage with the vast majority of the firms in their large
portfolios.
138. In addition, the decline of actively managed mutual funds could make hedge fund activism more costly,
as there will be fewer analysts identifying problematic companies and tipping off hedge fund activists.
139. Robert C. Pozen, The Role of Institutional Investors in Curbing Corporate Short-Termism, 71 FIN.
ANALYSTS J. 81, 83 (2015).
140. As activist hedge fund manager William A. Ackman explained in a letter to investors, "corporate
pension fund assets are one of the largest pools of capital invested in index funds. It does not help index fund
managers win business from corporate America if they have a reputation for being an activist or if they support
activists. In fact, the opposite is likely true. If their reputation is more for protecting incumbent management than
for supporting activists, they are much more likely to garner assets from corporate pension plans than index fund
managers who are known to vote against management." Letter from William A. Ackman, Pershing Square Capital
Management, L.P., to Shareholders (Jan. 26, 2016), https://assets.pershingsquareholdings.com/2014/09/PershingSquare-2015-Annual-Letter-PSl-January-26-2016.pdf; see also Wong, supra note 99; Black, Shareholder
PassivityReexamined, supra note 20, at 602.
141. Bebchuk et al., Agency Problems, supra note 26, at 19.
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all votes, 142 votes cast in favor of activist investors are impossible to hide from actual and
potential clients. 143

It is increasingly evident that management views close relationships with institutional
investors as a primary defense against investor activism.144 Indeed, creating goodwill
among institutional investors has become an increasingly important part of management's
job.145 Passive funds make especially good targets for these efforts because the benefits of
supporting an activist are almost non-existent.
Finally, passive funds might decline to support an activist for fear that doing so would
harm other investments. As Posner and others have argued, institutional investors with
large ownership positions in competitor firms could push management to compete less
vigorously so as to maintain high profits.146 One might suppose that doing so would
encourage activist hedge funds to target the colluding companies and agitate for a more
aggressive business strategy or for a change in management. But passive institutional
investors, which are most likely to have horizontal investments across competing firms,
would have no interest in seeing the activist investor succeed because the increased
competition would harm their other investments. In such a case, the passive funds could
simply refuse to support the intervention under the theory that it was short-sighted.
For these reasons, if approached by an activist, a passive fund would likely choose to
do nothing. 147 If the fund does support a hedge fund activist, it will likely do so for
idiosyncratic, and perhaps even political reasons.
The problem, of course, is that passive funds are increasingly likely to determine the
outcome of activist campaigns. And a world in which the success of activist interventions
hinges on passive funds should be unwelcome to observers on both sides of the investor

142. Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment
Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564, 6565 (Feb. 7, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 249, 270, 274).
143. Several empirical studies have found evidence that business relationships influence the voting decisions
of investment managers. See Dragana Cvijanovid et al., Ties thatBind: How Business ConnectionsAffect Mutual
Fund Activism, 71 J. FIN. 2933 (2016) (finding that mutual fund families with business ties to a corporation are
more likely to cast pro-management votes in closely contested situations at the corporation); Rasha Ashraf et al.,
Do Pension-RelatedBusiness Ties Influence Mutual Fund Proxy Voting? Evidence from Shareholder Proposals
on Executive Compensation, 47 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 567 (2009) (finding that mutual fund families

with greater business ties to corporations tend to vote more favorably to corporate managers on executive
compensation matters at all corporations).
144. Wall Street firms are developing teams that focus solely on advising management on how to strengthen
corporate relationships with large institutional investors as a defense to activism. See Sonali Basak & Beth Jinks,
It's Getting Harderto Keep the Barbariansat the Gate-andIt's This Guy's Job, BLOOMBERG MKTS. (Feb. 1,
2017,
4:00
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-0 1/lazard-s-jim-rossman-studies-

shareholding-to-help-fight-activists; see also The Swinging Pendulum, supra note 53; The Effect of Shareholder
Activism

on

Corporate

Strategy,

NYSE

(2016),

https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/ShareholderEngagement-SurveyReport_2016.pdf
145. Id.
146.

See Elhauge, supranote 10; Posner et al., supra note 7.

147. On average, the Big Three are less likely to support dissident board nominees than institutions with a
greater share of assets in active funds. In 2015, Vanguard supported dissident nominees 16% of the time;
BlackRock, 36%; and State Street, 28%. By contrast, Fidelity supported dissident nominees half of the time; T.
Rowe Price, 63%. See Steve Wolosky et al., ShareholderActivism: Investing in a Stronger CorporateAmerica,
OLSHAN
(2015),
https://www.olshanlaw.com/assets/htmldocuments/Shareholder%20Activism%20%20Investing/o2Oin%20a%2OStronger/o2OCorporate%2OAmerica.PDF.
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activism debate. Those who believe that activist interventions are harmful for companies
and their long-term shareholders should be concerned that passive funds will support
activist campaigns for reasons unrelated to their merits. By contrast, those who believe that
hedge fund activists play an important role in disciplining management should fear that
passive funds will often choose to vote with management or do nothing rather than take a
chance on an intervention proposed by an activist.
The problem is not only that passive funds are more likely to be unwilling to serve as
a keel to hedge fund activism. It is also concerning that hedge fund activists may tailor
their interventions to satisfy the least informed investors.
There is some evidence that the rise of passive investing is already affecting the types
of campaigns waged by hedge fund activists. A research team from Wharton conducted the
only empirical research on this topic. In two studies, they isolate the effects of passive fund
ownership by comparing companies near the cutoff point for being included in the Russell
1000 and the Russell 2000 indices.148 The first study found that greater ownership by
passive mutual funds is associated with less hedge fund activism and a greater incidence
of votes against activist shareholder proposals. 149 This was so despite the fact that a higher
percentage of passive fund ownership is correlated with the removal of takeover
defenses. 150
In a second study, which examined this question using a more recent dataset, the
authors again found that companies with greater passive fund ownership were slightly less
likely to be targets of activist campaigns than firms with less passive ownership (although
the result was not statistically significant). 151 But they discovered a bigger change in the
types of campaigns utilized by activists at companies with a higher concentration of passive
funds: the study reported an increase in campaigns seeking board representation and a
corresponding decrease in campaigns seeking policy changes such as increased
dividends.152 The study also found that a higher level of passive fund ownership correlated
with a higher number of proxy fights, as well as settlements culminating in a board seat for
the activist. 153

148. Appel et al., Standing on the Shoulders of Giants, supra note 52, at 2; Appel et al., Passive Investors,
supra note 66. Index funds are generally market-cap weighted, so the larger the market capitalization of the
company, the larger its representation in the index. As a result, companies at the bottom of the Russell 1000 have
little passive-fund ownership, while those at the top of the Russell 2000 have much more. And because those two
groups of firms are of similar size and represent a cross section of industries, the methodology isolates the changes

that arise from an increase in passive ownership.
149.

Appel et al., Passive Investors, supra note 66.

150.

Id. at 114.

151.

Appel et al., Standing on the Shoulders of Giants, supra note 52.

152.

Id.

153. Id. 2016 saw a pronounced reduction in activist interventions at large public companies-the same
companies that have the largest concentration of passive fund ownership. Andrew Birstingi, 2016 Shareholder

2017),
1,
(Feb.
FACTSET
Review,
Activism
https://insight.factset.com/hubfs/Resources/Research%20Desk/Market%20nsight/FactSet%27s%202016%20Y
ear-End%20Activism%20Review_2.1.17.pdf (noting that 2015 saw 32 campaigns against U.S. companies with
market values greater than $10 billion, compared with 17 of such campaigns in 2016). By contrast, smaller
companies with market capitalization less than $1 billion actually saw a dramatic rise in activist interventions. Id.
This data may indicate that hedge funds are returning to their traditional approach of focusing on smaller
companies in light of the high cost of assembling a stake in larger companies. See Coffee Jr. & Palia, supra note
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Of course, this is only the first empirical paper to consider this question,154 and it is
still too early to say how exactly the rise of passive investing will affect hedge fund
activism. But these results provide some preliminary evidence for the theory that passive
investing will alter activist campaigns, and not necessarily for the better. The researchers
interpreted the results as indicating that activist investors are more likely to utilize
aggressive tactics and be successful in appointing new directors to the board when passive
ownership increases. If true, it is concerning in light of the incentive problems facing
passive funds, as well as anecdotal evidence indicating that passive institutions do not
spend much time evaluating activist campaigns. It is also somewhat surprising because
passive funds are less likely to support dissident directors in proxy fights.1 5 5
One theory that could explain these results is that activist hedge funds are aware that
balance-sheet campaigns are likely to be viewed skeptically by passive funds. Therefore,
the better strategy for hedge funds is to pick targets that would benefit from a board
shakeup, a more intrusive and expensive endeavor, but one that may be consistent with the
institution's voting guidelines and therefore more likely to gain the support of the passive
funds. Another theory is that the threat of an expensive proxy contest will more likely
induce management to settle with an activist when management has trouble engaging with
and taking the temperature of the company's largest shareholders. 156
In sum, there is reason to believe that the rise of passive investing will undermine the
beneficial complementarity between institutional investors and activist hedge funds,
although more time and research is necessary to determine how exactly these dynamics
will play out.
IV. POLICY PROPOSALS

The flow of assets out of the hands of informed investors and into passive funds is
likely to have adverse consequences for the market for corporate influence, shareholders,
and the economy. Although precise quantification of this harm is beyond the scope of this
Article, there is evidence to suggest that it would be substantial. A recent study finds that
ownership by "distracted" institutional investors is correlated with a material reduction in
stock price. 157 Specifically, companies with institutional investors who experience
exogenous shocks to unrelated parts of their portfolio (and were therefore distracted) were
more likely to announce diversifying, value-destroying acquisitions with stock prices 33%

48, at 554. It may also indicate that hedge funds are learning that their campaigns are more uncertain when
companies have a high concentration of passive investors.
154. In addition, the instrumental variable used in the study-the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff point-has been
used in various different settings. See, e.g., Boone & White, supra note 126, casting doubt on the authors'
conclusion that the increase in passive investing is responsible for these effects. Cf Samuel Bazzi & Michael A.
Clemens, Blunt Instruments: Avoiding Common Pitfalls in Identifying the Causes of Economic Growth, 5 AM.
ECON. J. 152 (2013).
155. See Ryan Bubb & Emiliano Catan, The Party Structure of Mutual Funds (Feb. 14, 2018) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id-3124039; Wolosky et al., supra note 147.
156. For a skeptical take on settlements with activist investors, see John C. Coffee Jr., The Agency Costs of
Activism: Information Leakage, Thwarted Majorities, and the Public Morality (European Corp. Governance Inst.
(ECGI), Working Paper No. 373/2017, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract-3058319.
157. Elisabeth Kempf et al., Distracted Shareholders and CorporateActions, 30 REv. FIN. STUD. 1160
(2017).
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lower than the average announcement return, and 9.5% lower 36 months after deal
completion.' 58 Those companies were also more likely to grant opportunistically-timed
CEO stock options, cut dividends, and less likely to fire the CEO for poor performance.
The companies that did not experience a takeover underperformed their industry peers by
an average of 15 basis points per month. 159
Research quantifying benefits from takeover activity also suggests that reduced
constraints on management lead to large social welfare losses. Michael Jensen estimates
that four-and-a-half years of takeover activity in the 1980s generated $40 billion in
shareholder returns, excluding gains generated by actions undertaken proactively in an
attempt to ward off takeover attempts.160 Since then, the market for corporate influence
has eclipsed the market for corporate control as the primary mechanism for constraining
management, suggesting that the weakening of an important force for managerial discipline
will result in shareholder losses of a similar magnitude. 161
Of course, passive funds are unlikely to give management complete freedom-some
may choose to voice displeasure at the ballot box. But as mentioned, this could result in
the implementation of uniform governance structures across widely divergent firms, which
is also likely to harm shareholders. As just one example, a recent study found that the
average risk-adjusted return for companies that followed proxy advisor recommendations
when adjusting compensation was 0.44% lower than firms whose changes to compensation
were unrelated to proxy advisor recommendations.162
Therefore, there is reason to fear that the rise of passive investing will result in
substantial economic harm.' 63 And thus, lawmakers face a daunting question: what to do

158.
159.

Id. at 1662, 1680.
Id. at 1690.

160.

Michael C. Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence, 4 MIDLAND CORP. FIN. J. 1, 4

(1986).
161. See, e.g., Robert Thompson, The Limits of Hedge Fund Activism (Mar. 2007) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with Vanderbilt University) (describing how takeover activity receded in the face of the growing
availability of defensive tactics in the late '80s and attention shifted to institutional investors to confront the

problems created by the separation of ownership and control).
162.
163.

Larcker et al., Outsourcing Shareholder Voting, supra note 24.
Recent scholarship has observed a link between short-termism and ownership by "quasi-indexers," or

funds that adhere to a passive, buy-and-hold strategy of investing in a diversified set of firms. Specifically, firms
in concentrated industries with a high degree of quasi-indexer ownership invest far less than their peers, in spite

of high profitability and valuation. See German Gutierrez & Thomas Philippon, Investment-less Growth: An
Empirical
Investigation
(NBER,
Working
Paper
No.
22897,
2016),
A team from the
https://www.frbatlanta.org/-/media/Documents/research/seminars/2017/philipon-030817.pdf.
McKinsey Global Institute has attempted to quantify the costs of a short-term mindset, observing that companies
with a long-term focus (measured by the level of investment, as well as earnings quality and growth) have
consistently outperformed their industry peers since 2001: average revenue and earnings growth were 47% and
36% higher for the firms with a long-term mindset. In addition, this study observed that firms with a long-term

focus generated substantial social welfare gains: they added approximately 12,000 more jobs on average than
their peers from 2001 to 2015. The authors calculate that U.S. GDP would have grown by an additional $1 trillion
(and the economy would have generated more than 5 million additional jobs) if all companies had performed as
well as those with a long-term perspective. The study also posits that the U.S. economy will give up another $3
trillion in GDP and job growth by 2025 if companies continue to focus on short-term performance. See Dominic
Barton et al., Measuring the Economic Impact of Short-Termism (McKinsey Global Inst., Discussion Paper,

2017),

http://www.fcltglobal.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/20170206_mgi-
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when the market for corporate influence loses a critical mass of active participants, and
when the loudest voices are the least informed?
Government intervention is necessary because the market distortion is the result of an
acute collective action problem, a classic market failure justifying regulation. In addition,
investors who care about governance have incomplete information: although investors are
entitled to know about a fund's voting history, this information does not reveal much about
the quality of the voting or the fund's other governance efforts. Moreover, passive funds
have an incentive to exacerbate this information asymmetry between funds and investors
because advertising that the fund plays an active role in governance will help the fund
satisfy investors and attract additional assets. 164
There is of course the possibility that the market would self-correct in time. When
harms from passive investing materialize, they will be felt most severely by passive fund
investors. At that point, actively managed funds, which will have moved into different
segments of the market, will begin to attract investors because of their higher relative
performance.
But it would take time for investors to sufficiently correct market distortions; investors
do not change behavior immediately, and instead wait until years of poor performance
materialize into a visible long-term trend. If this sounds implausible, recall that academics
have recommended passive investment vehicles for forty years and only in the past ten
years have investors begun to favor them. 165 Without regulatory action, therefore, it is
possible that millions of investors would experience social welfare losses for many years.
For these reasons, lawmakers would be wise to consider taking action to reduce the
influence of passive funds in governance. Such action would be preferable to prohibiting
or discouraging investors from investing in low-fee and diversified investment vehicles.
From an investor's perspective, passive funds are generally superior to active funds, and
recent regulatory reforms have adopted this point of view.166 But future reforms should not
ignore the benefits that active investors provide for shareholders and the economy more
broadly.
Instead, regulators could consider restricting truly passive funds from participating in
governance, and specifically, voting in shareholder elections. The next Part proposes
several policy recommendations that would diminish the influence of passive funds in
corporate governance. It then demonstrates why these restrictions are superior to proposals
that would encourage institutional investors to be thoughtful participants in governance.

shorttermism.vfinal-public.pdfsfvrsn=0.
164. See Bioy & Bryan, supra note 108, at 3 ("Facing mounting pressure from a variety of stakeholders,
asset managers have little choice but to increase their level of engagement in the companies they invest in and
better demonstrate their commitment to driving change for the better."); Id. at 10 ("A growing number of investors
are also concerned about ESG issues and expect asset managers to address these matters directly with the
companies they own. Virtually all surveyed managers have reported an increase in client inquiries about

stewardship activities . . .").
165.
166.

See, e.g., Langbein & Posner, supra note 60.
See, e.g., Definition of the Term "Fiduciary"; Conflict of Interest Rule-Retirement Investment Advice,

81 Fed. Reg. 20,946, 20,946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, and 2550).
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A. Rethinking PassiveFund Voting
The primary governance problem created by the rise of passive investing is that
passive funds wield sizeable influence in governance, and yet they have little incentive to
use their influence to maximize firm value. In light of the fact that any investment in voting
will likely generate higher costs than benefits for the fund, it is surprising that passive funds
vote at all.
The answer is that most investment fund managers believe, wrongly, that they are
required to cast proxy votes under SEC regulations. The origin of this misperception is
relatively recent. Mutual and pension funds have been highly regulated since the enactment
of the Investment Company Act of 1940, but for years, federal and state regulation was
largely indifferent to their voting and governance activities.167 By the 1970s, however, as
the growth of institutional ownership portended a new governance dynamic, the SEC began
to take the position informally that investment funds had a fiduciary duty to vote their
shares in accordance with the best interests of their beneficiaries.168
On January 23, 2003, the SEC solidified this position by adopting a rule mandating
that investment fund advisors disclose their votes, as well as their policies and procedures
for voting, in corporate elections. In the adopting release to the rule, the SEC explained,
"the investment adviser to a mutual fund is a fiduciary that owes the fund a duty of . .
good faith. This fiduciary duty extends to . .. the voting of proxies relating to the fund's
portfolio securities." 1 69 This rule was widely interpreted as mandating that mutual funds
vote all of the shares of their portfolio companies. As a result, large asset managers,
including the Big Three, generally do so.
But the law has never required investment advisers to vote all portfolio shares on all
matters. Recently, the DOL categorically rejected that position in an interpretation of the
application of ERISA fiduciary standards to the exercise of the shareholder franchise:
The fiduciary duties described at ERISA Sec. 404(a)(1)(A) and (B), require that,
in voting proxies . . . the responsible fiduciary shall consider only those factors
that relate to the economic value of a plan's investment and shall not subordinate
the participants and beneficiaries to unrelated objectives . . . . If the responsible
fiduciary reasonably determines that the cost of voting (including the cost of
research, if necessary, to determine how to vote) is likely to exceed the expected
economic benefits of voting, or if the exercise of voting results in the imposition
170
of . . other restrictions, the fiduciary has an obligation to refrain from voting.

167.

See Alan R. Palmiter, Mutual Fund Voting of Portfolio Shares: Why Not Disclose?, 23 CARDOZO L.

REv. 1419, 1461-62 (2002).
168. Id. (quoting an SEC Staff Report of Corporate Accountability which explained, "The fiduciary principle
applies to all aspects of investment management, including voting. In exercising the stock franchise, the fiduciary
has a duty to vote in such a way as to promote the interests of the beneficiaries."); Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz,

Deputy Assistant Sec'y, Dep't of Labor, to Helmuth Fandl, Chairman of Ret. Bd., Avon Prods., Inc., Dep't of
Labor Interpretive Letter on Avon Products, Inc. Employees' Retirement Plan, 1988 WL 897696, at *2 (Feb. 23,
1988) ("In general, the fiduciary act of managing plan assets which are shares of corporate stock would include
the voting of proxies appurtenant to those shares of stock.").

169. Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment
Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564, 6565 (Feb. 7, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239. 249, 270, 274).
170.

Interpretivebulletin relatingto the exercise ofshareholderrights...Proxy voting policies orguidelines,
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The SEC has taken a similar view, explaining: "We do not suggest that an adviser that fails
to vote every proxy would necessarily violate its fiduciary obligations. There may even be
times when refraining from voting a proxy is in the client's best interest, such as when the
adviser determines that the cost of voting the proxy exceeds the expected benefit to the
client." 17 1
In sum, rather than being required to vote all shares on all matters, an institutional
investor is required to balance the cost of casting a vote on a particular matter-which
includes the cost of analysis and casting the vote, as well as the risk the vote would reduce
shareholder value-against the potential economic benefit to be gained by voting. If the
investor concludes that the costs of voting exceeds the benefits, the duty is to not vote.172
Under this framework (and in light of the lack of consensus about governance best practices
that would justify a one-size-fits-all voting approach), it is likely that a passive fund
manager who votes under all circumstances would breach its fiduciary duty to investors,
unless that fund manager is relying on information from an active fund manager housed
within the same institution.
Perhaps all that is needed is for the SEC to emphasize once again that passive fund
managers breach their fiduciary duties to investors when their voting creates costs in excess
of the benefits. If passive funds knew that they could be subject to liability for uninformed
voting, perhaps some would abstain more often.
It is likely, however, that something more is needed to deter passive funds from voting.
This is because the institution may benefit from casting votes in shareholder elections, even
when voting is not in investors' best interests. There are two motivations that may compel
institutions to vote regularly. First, if the institution is perceived as being an involved and
engaged steward, that will help funds attract assets and clients, especially from pension
funds (a large and growing passive fund client) or other groups that view governance as a
priority. 173 The fact that the Big Three increasingly tout their governance expertise in their

Gov'T PUB. OFF. (emphasis added), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2011-title29-vol9/pdf/CFR-2011title29-vol9-sec2509-08-2.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2018). The release went on to explain: 'The fiduciary
obligations ofprudence and loyalty to plan participants and beneficiaries require the responsible fiduciary to vote
proxies on issues that may affect the economic value of the plan's investments. However, fiduciaries also need to
take into account costs when deciding whether and how to exercise their shareholder rights, including the voting

of shares. Such costs include, but are not limited to, expenditures related to developing proxy resolutions, proxy
voting services and the analysis of the net effect of a particular issue on the economic value of the plan's
investment. Fiduciaries must take all of these factors into account in determining whether . .
the voting of a
proxy . . is expected to have an effect on the economic value of the plan's investment that will outweigh the cost

of exercising such rights." Id.
171. Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585, 6587 (Feb. 7, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 275) (emphasis added).
172.

See Nathan, The ParallelUniverses, supra note 109.

173.

CalPERS, the largest U.S. pension fund (with $300 billion in assets under management) states clearly

in its investment policy that "CalPERS expects all ...

external managers of CalPERS capital to integrate the

CalPERS Principles into investment decision making, including proxy voting ..... Total FundInvestmentPolicy,
CALPERS, https://www.calpers.ca.gov/page/investments/about-investment-office/policies (last visited Mar. 12,
2018).
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marketing materials, in speeches,174 and in op-edsl75 indicates that they believe that
creating an appearance of governance expertise will help them win clients. Voting is the
least expensive, yet most visible, way to demonstrate involvement in governance.176
Moreover, there is a first-mover disadvantage to abstaining from voting-the market
could view the decision to not vote as a signal of poor quality, especially when all other
funds continue to highlight their governance abilities. In other words, unless all passive
funds collectively gave up their voting rights, it is unlikely that any one institution would
voluntarily choose to do so.
Second, and more cynically, an institution may view the role of key decision-maker as
a powerful tool that can help it win points with another set of actual or potential clients:
the companies that they invest in. If company management is a client of the institution,
either because it invests employee 40 1(k) assets or utilizes other services, that institution
will have a strong motivation to cast management-friendly votes in shareholder elections.
The Big Three are therefore unlikely to voluntarily abstain from voting without legal
intervention. The Parts that follow propose several rules that would restrict passive funds
from voting in shareholder elections. 177
1. Eliminate Passive Fund Voting
The simplest proposal would restrict passive funds from voting their shares. 178 In other
words, the law would treat a passive fund manager like a derivative holder when it comes
to voting.

174.

See, e.g., F. William McNabb

Ill,

Getting to Know You: The Case for Significant Shareholder

Engagement, HARv.
L.
SCH.
F.
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
& FIN.
REG.
(June
24,
2015),
https://corpgov.1aw.harvard.edu/2015/06/24/getting-to-know-you-the-case-for-significant-shareholderengagement/.
[W]e are permanent shareholders. To borrow a phrase from Warren Buffet: Our favorite

holding period is forever. We're going to hold your stock when you hit your quarterly earnings
target. And we'll hold it when you don't. We're going to hold your stock if we like you. And
if we don't. We're going to hold your stock when everyone else is piling in. And when
everyone else is running for the exits .... That is precisely why we care so much about good
governance.

175.

F. William McNabb III, Proxy Votes CertainlyMatter to Index Funds, WALL ST. J. (July 5, 2017, 5:16

PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/proxy-votes-certainly-matter-to-index-funds-1499289400;
Ultimate
Long
Term
Investors,
SEEKING
ALPHA
(Aug.
2,
2017,

Vanguard, The
8:00

AM),

https://seekingalpha.com/article/4089524-ultimate-long-term-investors.
176. See Bioy & Bryan, supra note 108, at 11 ("Voting is the most visible tool for shareholders to hold
companies to account. . . .").
177. Ronald Gilson and Curtis Milhaupt have made a similar proposal to limit the voting ability of sovereign
wealth funds who acquire significant stakes in domestic companies. See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J.
Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New

Merchantilism, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1345 (2008).
178. To ease the burden of implementation, the rule would specify that restricted shares would not be counted
in the denominator for quorum or director election purposes. In addition, the rule would not encumber the stock
and thus devalue it-voting stock would continue to provide the holder with the right to vote, but the passive
institution would be restricted from exercising that right. Finally, the rule could incorporate narrow exceptions to

reduce the risk of abuse, such as allowing voting rights for corporate actions that would harm passive investors'
economic interests.
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There is a compelling legal rationale for such a law: a passive fund attracts investors
on the basis of its ability to track an index. As such, active and informed voting will
increase costs for investors without corresponding benefits and therefore would arguably
breach the fund's fiduciary duty under ERISA. Likewise, a thoughtless, automated
approach to voting would also be likely to harm investors. As such, the law would make
all parties better off by restricting passive funds from casting uninformed votes.
The rule could employ a presumption that any fund that uses indexing as an investment
strategy is a passive fund. That presumption could be rebutted, allowing the passive fund
to be "certified" for voting, if the fund showed that its strategy incorporated meaningful
portfolio company research-including ongoing monitoring and fundamental analysisand that its investment in governance is above a certain threshold (based on the fund's
size). A passive fund could also be certified to vote shares of certain companies if it
demonstrated that it had access to information generated by actively managed funds housed
in the same institution. 179 To qualify, the passive fund would need to show that the actively
managed fund had a meaningful investment in the shared portfolio company and that the
active fund otherwise met the requirements for voting certification (i.e., that it met the
monitoring, analysis, and investment threshold). Finally, a passive fund could retain its
votes if it committed itself to "mirror voting" under all circumstances, which would require
the passive fund to vote its shares in the same way as the other shareholders.
This rule would be relatively costless to implement because it would simply relieve
passive funds of obligations rather than impose new ones. In addition, passive fund
managers would be unlikely to oppose a rule that freed them from onerous governance
obligations that have few benefits for their investors. i80
Moreover, a passive fund that wished to retain its voting power could do so by
increasing its investment in governance. For this reason, the rule would encourage
beneficial fund differentiation and make the market for funds more transparent: investors
who cared about governance could choose a certified fund and pay a higher fee to support
its governance efforts. Other investors who wanted nothing more than stable returns could
invest in truly passive funds, without fear of paying for costly and potentially harmful
voting efforts.
Of course, the primary benefit of this rule would be to diminish the voice of
uninformed investors in governance, reducing the risk of market distortion. But by
diminishing the voice of passive funds, the rule would also preserve the influence of

179. Many passive funds would likely meet this exception in light of the fact that they are often housed within
the same institution as actively managed funds. But if the level of overlap declines with the rise of passive
investing, the rule would greatly reduce the uninformed voting power of passively managed funds. Moreover, the
exception might have the beneficial effect of encouraging institutions to maintain actively managed funds whose

investments overlap with passive funds.
180.

The fact that the Big Three have vocally opposed the rising incidence of dual class structures casts some

doubt on this claim. They have also participated in lobbying efforts to ban dual class companies from stock
exchanges and stock indices, arguing that they are forced to buy nonvoting and low-voting shares because of their
indexing strategy, even when they oppose it. See Alexandra Scaggs, Investor Group to Exchanges: Stop Dual-

Class
Listings,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Oct.
11,
2012,
12:29
PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SBl0000872396390443749204578050431073959840 (discussing the controversy
surrounding companies that issue shares with unequal voting rights). But this opposition has come from the
leaders of the Big Three and is consistent with the theory that it is motivated by the institution's desire to retain
influence, rather than an optimal strategy for the institution's passive funds.
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informed investors by giving each active investor a proportional increase in voting
power. 18 1 Although voting is only a part of the institutional investor's toolkit, the added
voting power would improve active fund's efficacy in backroom conversations. It would
also enable investors that are motivated to secure the long-term health of the company to
determine the success of hedge fund activist campaigns.
2. Institute Pass-Through Votingfor Passive Funds
The second proposal would not eliminate passive voting entirely, but would instead
specify that voting power for "non-routine" matters would flow through to the passive
fund's investors in a phenomenon known as "pass-through voting."182 This would mean
that two groups of investors would control the funds' votes: institutions, such as pension
funds like CalPERs, 183 as well as retail shareholders. The former group of investors are
likely to be relatively sophisticated, engaged, and capable of exercising their vote in an
informed manner, especially if they also own shares in the company through other active
investments. The latter group of investors would be unlikely to vote because of collective
action problems, providing a benefit similar to that of the first proposal-reducing the
184
incidence of uninformed voting.
There is some precedent in the law for pass-through voting: other investment vehicles,
such as Employee Stock Ownership Plans, are required to pass through votes to plan
participants. 185 In addition, mutual funds already have a voting mechanism in place for
their own governance, and so the rule could simply require mutual funds to circulate proxy
materials for portfolio companies using the same process.
However, because passively managed funds involve pooled investments, the burden
of passing voting authority for hundreds of companies to investors would not only be
overwhelming for the fund, but also for investors. Restricting the rule to "non-routine"
matters would help reduce this burden. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) provides
a blueprint for such a distinction: under NYSE rules, brokers cannot cast discretionary
votes for shareholders on non-routine matters, which are defined to include director
elections, proposals to declassify the board of directors, proposals to eliminate
supermajority voting requirements, and proposals enacting certain types of anti-takeover
181. Corporate insiders would also benefit from an increase in voting power, potentially worsening agency
cost problems. However, except for the few shareholder proposals that passive funds embrace, the Big Three
generally cast votes in favor of management. Therefore, omitting the passive fund vote would more likely
decrease management's influence over governance in most cases.
182. See, e.g., Richard M. Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A Comparative
Perspective, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 47-52 (1991) (proposing pass-through voting to allow pension fund
beneficiaries to determine fund voting policies); Jennifer S. Taub, Able but Not Willing: The Failure of Mutual
Fund Advisers to Advocate for Shareholders'Rights, 34 J. CORP. L. 843, 888-89 (2009) (mentioning optional
pass-through voting as a potential option to allow mutual fund shareholders to overcome the passivity of their
intermediaries).
183.

See ANANTH N. MADHAVAN, EXCIHANGE-TRADED FUNDS AND THE NEW DYNAMICS OF INVESTING 16

(Oxford Univ. Press 2016) (noting that 65% of ETF ownership is institutional).
19,
2015),
(Feb.
Process
Proxy
the
Ensuring
SEC,
Release,
184. Press
https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/021915-psclaa.html (noting that retail shareholder participation in the proxy
process has been falling steadily since 2009, with less than a 13% response rate for the period from July 1, 2013
to June 30, 2014).
185. See 26 U.S.C.S. § 409(e)(2) (approved 1/10/2018).
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provision overrides.186 Similarly, a pass-through voting rule could mandate that votes for
non-routine matters would pass through to investors.
This version of the rule would have another benefit. Because the passive fund would
also be likely to pass implementation costs on to investors, this rule would make passively
managed funds slightly more expensive, and thus, slightly less appealing relative to
actively managed funds. In this way, the rule could somewhat ameliorate the free rider
problem and staunch the flow of assets from active to passive funds.
3. Institute Pass-Through Voting as a Default
Finally, a rule could provide for pass-through voting on non-routine matters, such as
a default, allowing investors the option of reassigning the proxy back to the fund.187 The
primary benefit of this version of the rule is that it would foster competition and
differentiation in governance activity across passive funds. Certain passive funds might
invest in monitoring and analysis so as to market themselves as governance experts and
attract not just investors, but their votes. Moreover, institutions that house both passive and
active funds will be more likely to recognize the value of active fund stewardship if it helps
the institution secure greater voting power.
A passive fund could also attract investors and votes by developing governance
expertise in a certain area. And although passive funds that invest in governance would
likely charge higher fees than truly passive funds, investors who care about good
governance would be more likely to tolerate them. If this seems implausible, consider the
modest success of social responsibility funds, which attract investors by selecting portfolio
companies based on certain criteria, such as a commitment to environmentally friendly
practices.188
For investors who want nothing more than low-cost diversification, there would be the
option to invest in passive funds that also take a passive approach to governance. The
investor who chooses such a fund would likely hold on to her vote-default rules tend to
be sticky -89and
abstain from voting. In other words, this rule would ensure the votes that
are the least likely to be the product of informed thinking are also the least likely to be cast.

Any of these simple and low-cost rules would diminish the uninformed voting power
of passive funds in governance and thus preserve the voice and influence of active and
informed investors. But there are other benefits. By restricting the governance activities of

186. See N.Y.S.E. Manual Rule 452 (CCH) ¶ 2452 (2013). NYSE Information Memo 12-4, Application of
Rule 452 to Certain Types of Corporate Governance Proxy Proposals, NYSE REGULATION,
http://www.lexissecuritiesmosaic.com/gateway/nyse/info-memos/12-4.pdf.
187. The rule would be drafted in such a way as to avoid the possibility that funds would evade it by adding
a standard clause to every share purchase agreement that reassigned voting authority back to the fund managers.
As an example, the rule could require the active assignment of voting rights by investors.
188. Does Socially Responsible Investing Make FinancialSense?, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 28, 2016, 10:18 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/does-socially-responsible-investing-make-financial-sense-1456715888 (discussing
the rising popularity of socially responsible investing).
189. See Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 3, 4-5 (2006) (describing the "iron law of default
inertia").
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passive funds, these proposed rules would increase the visibility of benefits provided by
active funds. In this way, these rules would improve market transparency, enabling
investors to distinguish between funds with governance expertise and those that offer
nothing more than the opportunity to make low-cost, and stable market returns. They would
also make it easier for active funds to attract investors who care about governance and
make it harder for passive funds to free ride on their investments in stewardship. 190
At first glance, these rules appear to be an extreme departure from our system of
shareholder democracy. Traditionally, shares of common stock include economic rights,
as well as a right to vote that is proportional to share ownership. But shareholder democracy
is not a political democracy where every person has a constitutional right to vote. Instead,
voting rights are generally allocated on a per share basis-in other words, voting power
grows with an individual's stake in the company. And for over a century, permissive
corporate codes have allowed companies to depart from the one-share-one-vote default and
191
even deprive classes of stock of voting rights.
Nor does the right to vote in a shareholder election further participatory or civic
interests. It originated as a protection for the residual claimants and has been justified as
efficient because it allocates voting control to those who have the best incentives to use
their vote to maximize the firm's value.192 In other words, voting is instrumental to
corporate welfare only, and there is therefore a principled basis for depriving uninformed
shareholders of the right to vote if doing so would improve firm efficiency.193
190. Restricting the voting power of uninformed and unmotivated shareholders has another important
benefit. Delaware courts have increasingly awarded special deference to corporate decisions that are ratified by a
majority of disinterested shareholders. For example, in Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings, the Delaware
Supreme Court held that transactions subject to enhanced scrutiny under Revlon will be reviewed under the
business judgment rule if such shareholder approval is granted. 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015). This decision was
justified, in part, by the fact that public companies are held by sophisticated institutional investors with "an actual
economic stake in the outcome." Id. at 314. But for the reasons discussed, passive fund voting is fraught with
agency problems, undermining the rationale that courts should defer to decisions blessed by their votes.
191. State law today generally provides corporations with considerable flexibility with respect to allocations
of voting rights: virtually all state corporate codes adopt one vote per common share as the default rule but allow
corporations to depart from the norm. See Stephen Bainbridge, The Scope of the SEC's Authority Over
Shareholder Voting Rights 5 (UCLA Sch. of Law Research, Paper No. 07-16, 2007),
https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract-id=985707 [hereinafter Bainbridge, SEC Authority]; DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151 (1953) (authorizing a corporation to have different classes of stock with such rights,
powers, and preferences as may be set forth in the certificate of incorporation or the board, if the certificate gives
the board that power). Many corporations depart from the one-share-one-vote rule by adopting dual class capital
structures that are routinely upheld by courts.
In fact, limitations on shareholder voting rights are as old as the corporate form itself. In the mid-1 800s,
before the adoption of general incorporation statutes, corporate charters granted by legislatures employed varying
voting structures. Some embraced a one-share-one-vote rule, while others limited the voting rights of large
shareholders, such as by capping the number of votes any one shareholder could cast. Bainbridge, SEC Authority,
at 4. By the 1900s, the vast majority of U.S. corporations had established one vote per share as a default rule,
leaving corporations free to deviate from the statutory standard. Id. at 5. During this time, the current norm of
limiting the voting rights of preferred stock became common. Id. In addition, companies began to issue nonvoting common stock-in the years between 1927 and 1932, at least 288 corporations issued non-voting or limited
voting rights shares (which was almost half of the total number of such issuances). Id. at 7.
192.

See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE EcoNOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE

LAw 63, 67 (1991).
193. Others have made similar arguments in the context of judicial elections, where the large majority of
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But how could one of these proposals be enacted into law? The SEC is an obvious
candidate because regulation of the proxy process is a core function of the agency.
However, the SEC's only effort to regulate substantive voting rights was struck down by
the D.C. Circuit in 1990.194 During the 1980s, as companies began to recognize the power
of dual class stock schemes to defend against hostile takeover bids, the SEC responded by
adopting Rule 19c-4, which effectively prohibited public companies from issuing securities
or taking other corporate action nullifying, restricting, or disparately reducing the voting
rights of existing shareholders. 195 It did this by adding a new rule to the listing standard of
each national securities exchange and securities association. 196
The SEC had argued that it had the authority to adopt the rule based on Securities
Exchange Act § 19(c), which permits the agency to amend exchange rules provided that
the action furthers the Act's purposes. The SEC contended that § 14(a) of the Act embodied
the purpose of protecting shareholder democracy. The D.C. Circuit disagreed, ruling that
§ 14(a) did not give the SEC power to regulate substantive aspects of shareholder voting,
but only to regulate the procedures by which proxy solicitations are conducted, as well as
proxy voting disclosure. 197
The Supreme Court did not review that decision, but the Court had previously made
clear that it views the substance of corporate voting rights as solely being a matter of state
concern. In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., the Court explained, "No principle of
corporation law and practice is more firmly established than a State's authority to regulate
domestic corporations, including the authority to define the voting rights of
shareholders."l98 Accordingly, without a clear expression of congressional intent, it is
unlikely that the Supreme Court would uphold a federal agency's enactment of a law
governing the substance of shareholder voting rights.
But the Securities Exchange Act's preference for shareholder democracy is intended
to protect against the "control of great corporations by a very few persons."l99 When the
equal allocation of corporate voting rights has the potential to empower a small number of
institutions and risk market distortions and wide-scale economic harm, it may be
appropriate for the federal government to step in. And federal intervention is likely the only
option: corporations would be unlikely to voluntarily amend their certificates of
incorporation to restrict the majority of their shareholders from voting, and states could not
be counted on to require such a restriction that might cause large institutional investors to
flee to other states.

voters are uninformed and incentivizing them to master technical issues of governance arguably results in an
inefficient division of labor. See Richard A. Posner, JudicialAutonomy in a PoliticalEnvironment, 38 ARUz. ST.
L.J. 1, 5 (2006); Dmitry Bam, Voter Ignorance andJudicial Elections, 102 Ky. L.J. 553 (2013); Charles Gardner
Geyh, Why JudicialElections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 52 (2003) (discussing voting in judicial elections).
194. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
195. Bainbridge, SEC Authority, supra note 191, at 8.
196. Id.at9.
197. Bus. Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 408.
198. CTS Corp. v Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987); see also Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462, 477-80 (1977) (clarifying that internal corporate affairs are for the states to govern).
199. SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 518 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948)
(discussing the reasons behind the enactment of Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act).
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B. The Difficulty ofIncentivizing Beneficial Investment in Governance
Thus far, in considering how to address the agency cost problem, regulators and
scholars have proposed reforms aimed at incentivizing large institutional investors to be
responsible stewards of their investments. For example, the SEC justified rules imposing
proxy voting disclosure obligations on mutual funds on the ground that such rules would
"encourage funds to become more engaged in corporate governance of issuers held in their
portfolios." 200 These rules have not had this intended effect-instead, it appears that
disclosure obligations have merely increased pressure on mutual funds to vote all shares,
an enormous task that makes it difficult, if not impossible, to cast an informed vote in all
cases.201 The rules also failed to address the collective action problem that discourages
mutual funds from investing in governance. Thus, any future reform aimed at encouraging
institutional investor engagement would need to tackle this incentive problem head on.
One possible reform could be modeled after the derivative suit, the traditional corporate
tool used to combat agency problems within a corporation. The derivative suit was intended
to reduce conflicts between managers and shareholders by allowing shareholders to pursue
claims on the behalf of the corporation.202 The classic case is an action for a breach of
fiduciary duty against corporate directors: the directors cannot be expected to cause the
corporation to sue themselves, and so the derivative action allows the shareholders to take
over the litigation and prosecute on behalf of the corporation. If the suit confers benefits to
the corporation and its shareholders, the shareholder plaintiff can recover attorneys' fees
and expenses from the corporation,203 which reduces the problem of other shareholders
free riding off of the efforts of the shareholder plaintiff. 204
Like the shareholder who brings a beneficial derivative suit, a fund that invests in
governance at a portfolio company secures a benefit that all shareholders desire but are not
willing to pay for. Therefore, a rule providing expense reimbursement for shareholders
who intervene in governance and secure a benefit would make stewardship more appealing
for institutional investors.
Currently, our regulatory system does the opposite-regulators penalize actively
managed funds that invest in monitoring and governance by scrutinizing management fees.
These policies are well-intentioned, as there is ample evidence of funds levying
inappropriately high fees to take advantage of uninformed investors.205 But scrutinizing
fees is a blunt tool for policing abuse, and a rule that would allow a governance intervenor
to recoup expenses associated with a beneficial intervention would reduce the risk of
unintended consequences caused by regulatory scrutiny. It would also improve the

200. Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment
Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564, 6566 (Feb. 7, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R pts. 239, 240, 270, 274).
201. See Strine Jr., Can We Do Better?, supra note 5, at 483-90 (noting that "the present system involves
too many votes for the institutional investor community to address thoughtfully and creates a rational basis to
suspect that even proxy advisory firms cannot afford to employ enough qualified analysts to provide a genuinely
studied recommendation on every vote").
202. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and
Derivative Litigation:Economic Analysis andRecommendationsfor Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 10 (1991).
203. Ralph C. Ferrara et al., Attorneys' Fees and Incentive Awards, in SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE
LITIGATION: BESEIGING THE BOARD § 14.06 (2005).
204. FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 897 n.192 (2007).
205. See WILLIAM BIRDTHISTLE, EMPIRE OF THE FUND: THE WAY WE SAVE Now (2016).
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competitiveness of funds with governance expertise and thus staunch the flow of assets out
of those funds.
Such a rule could define a reimbursable governance intervention to be an action that
results in a policy change that substantially benefits the company. The benefit could be
demonstrated by a sustained (at least a year) boost in stock price following the intervention.
The intervenor would receive costs associated with that intervention, limited to research
costs incurred no more than one month prior to the intervention, as well as the costs of
meeting with management, voting, or waging a proxy contest. Those costs could not exceed
the benefit to the corporation.
Although this rule would incentivize governance interventions, it would do so at a
lower than optimal level. This is because a fund would only be able to recoup a fraction of
the costs, because interventions generally require sustained, finn-specific monitoring and
the development of governance expertise over many years. Relatedly, it would be difficult
to quantify the costs and the long-term benefit of the intervention, and therefore the rule
would likely generate expensive litigation.
One might suppose that awarding a portion of the benefit from the intervention, rather
than the cost, would address some of these concerns. As an example, the SEC's
whistleblower program provides a monetary reward for "high-quality original information
that leads to [an] enforcement action in which over $1,000,000 in sanctions is ordered." 206
The range for the award is 10% and 30% of the money collected.207 If a shareholder (or a
group of shareholders) were able to recoup even 10% of the benefit of any governance
intervention, this would greatly improve incentives to invest in stewardship.
But there are reasons why the law generally avoids benefit-based liability: it is very
difficult to quantify the benefit, as well as determine causation. The latter determination
would be particularly challenging in this context, where an activist investor may influence
management
In addition,
intervention
incentivizing
benefits. 209

206.
207.
208.

by targeting a firm in the same industry, or making a threat to intervene. 208
the statutory definition of "benefit" would likely influence the type of
that is chosen, again risking governance distortions. Therefore, a rule
investors to be engaged owners would likely result in more costs than

Office of the Whistleblower, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower (last visited Mar. 12, 2018).
Id.
An example from civil rights law exemplifies some of the difficulties associated with determining

causation. For years, courts have struggled to interpret fee-shifting provisions in the Fair Housing Amendments
Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, which permit a court to award reasonable attorney's fees to the

"prevailing party." In 2001, the Supreme Court held that the predominating approach-examining whether the
plaintiff was the "catalyst" for the result-was improper. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va.

Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001). Instead, a court could only shift fees if the plaintiff secured
a judgment on the merits or in a court-ordered consent decree. Id. In so holding, the Court emphasized the
difficulty of determining the defendant's subjective motivation in changing its conduct-the catalyst approach

was "clearly not a formula for 'ready administrability."' Id. at 609. A law allowing a plaintiff to recover a portion
of the benefit from a governance intervention would create similar administrative difficulties.

209.

Another possible solution would be to regulate the proxy advisors that offer advice to passive funds. In

fact, Congress is considering whether to mandate greater regulatory oversight of proxy advisors, proposing to
require them to: register with the SEC; employ an ombudsman to receive complaints about voting information

accuracy; disclose potential conflicts of interest; disclose procedures and methodologies for formulating proxy
recommendations and analyses; and essentially provide companies with an opportunity to review and comment

536

The Journalof CorporationLaw

[Vol. 43:3

V. CONCLUSION

In the past twenty years, the market for corporate influence has become an important
force for managerial discipline. Yet, the rise of passive investing has the potential to
dampen and distort this market, increasing agency costs and harming shareholder welfare.
Although the amount of assets invested in actively managed funds is currently ameliorating
the risk of distortion, the rapid influx of assets into passive funds may soon overwhelm this
temporary balance. Lawmakers, therefore, should consider whether legal intervention is
warranted.
At this time, it appears that a rule restricting passive funds from voting would offer
the most benefits and generate the fewest costs. Although voting is just one tool used by
institutional investors to influence management, the rise of passive investing will make it
even more important. Active fund analysts are the primary drivers of meetings with
management and the board; as their number decreases, institutional investor engagement
will become less frequent and less effective. Accordingly, fewer battles will be settled in a
backroom conversations, as many are now, and a greater number will be resolved in
expensive proxy battles.
By restricting passive funds from voting, the law would reduce the risk of governance
distortion created by the rise of passive investing. It would also preserve the voice of
informed investors as a force for discipline and a safeguard against agency problems
created by the separation of ownership and control.

on a proposed recommendation by a proxy advisory firm before the recommendation is provided to investors. See
Corporate Governance Reform and Transparency Act of 2016, H.R. 5311, 114th Cong. (2016). But this regulation
would significantly increase the costs of third party proxy advisory services without addressing the real problem:
that third party proxy advisors lack any financial incentive in the outcome of their recommendations. And it would
be difficult for Congress to craft a rule that would lessen that problem.

